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INTRODUCTION
As terrorism directed at the United States, its citizens, and its for-
eign interests has increased,' so has the United States's effort to en-
force its laws criminalizing terrorist activities2 planned and conducted
primarily outside the United States.-4 Thus far, however, the federal
government has been unable to see most terrorism investigations
1 The United States is the world's leading target of international terrorism, and gov-
ernment officials expect the use of terrorism against the United States, its citizens, and its
interests to continue both domestically and abroad. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORISM,
105TH CONG., COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM iii (2000);
PAUL R. PILLAR, TERRORISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 57 (2001); Roger Medd & Frank Gold-
stein, International Terrorism on the Eve of a New Millennium, 20 STUD. CONFLICr & TERRORISM
281, 289 (1997). In 2001, of the 348 total international terrorist attacks around the world,
see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATI'ERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 2001 app. I, at 171 (2002) [here-
inafter PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM], available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/
pgtrpt/2001/pdf, 219 were directed at U.S. targets, see id. app. 1, at 176.
2 Federal law defines international terrorism to include activities that: (1) "involve
violent acts or acts dangerous to hunan life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the
jurisdiction of the United States or of any State"; (2) "appear to be intended to intimidate
or coerce a civilian population; ... influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or ... affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping"; and
(3) "occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons
they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators
operate or seek asylum." 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2000). With regard to international terror-
ist conspiracies perpetrated within the United Suttes, federal law provides that any person,
within or without the United States, who threatens, attempts, or conspires to kill, kidnap,
maim, comlnmit an assault resulting in serious bodily injury, or assault with a dangerous
weapon any person within the United States is subject to criminal sanction. Id.
§ 2332b(a) (I) (A), (a) (2). The same sanctions apply to any person who threatens, at-
tempts, or conspires to create a substantial risk of serious bodily injuly to any other person
by destroying or damaging, or by attempting or conspiring to destroy or damage, any struc-
ture, conveyance, or other real or personal property within the United States. Id.
§ 2332b(a) (I) (B), (a) (2). Federal law extends to federal law enforcement officials extra-
territorial jurisdiction over international terrorist conspiracies and grants the Attorney
General primary investigative responsibility for all federal crimes of terrorism. See id.
§ 2332b(e)-(f).
3 Between 1993 and 1999, the number of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
agents working on terrorism investigations rose from 550 to 1,400. See PILLAR, supra note 1,
at 80. Between 1993 and 2000, the percentage of the FBI's budget devoted to combating
terrorism rose from 4% to 10%. See id.
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through to criminal prosecution, a reality that undermines its efforts
to prevent international terrorism through criminalization. 4 Between
1997 and 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) opened
nearly 40,000 international terrorism investigations,5 of which only
385 were referred to federal prosecutors.6 Of these referrals, only 115
led to prosecutions 7-mostly post-attack prosecutions.8 And of these
prosecutions, only twenty-four produced convictions,9 half of which
resulted in the imposition of jail sentences of ten months or less. 10
Syracuse University researchers concluded from this information that
4 Successful criminal prosecution should, theoretically, reduce incidences of terror-
ism by (1) leading to the incarceration of terrorists who might otherwise commit further
acts of terrorism, (2) deterring future terrorists from acting at all, (3) making it logistically
more difficult for terrorists to carry out acts of terrorism, and (4) encouraging other gov-
ernments to help prevent terrorism. See id. at 81.
5 See Transactional Records Access Clearing House, FBI Efforts in Combating Terror-
ism, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/Oll203/fbi-invest.html (last visited Apr.
9, 2003).
6 See Transactional Records Access Clearing House, International Terrorism Refer-
rals for Criminal Prosecution, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/O11203/int-
terref.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003). The number of referrals has increased since
September 11, 2001. See Transactional Records Access Clearing House, Criminal Enforce-
ment Against Terrorists: A TRAC Special Report Supplement, at http://trac.syr.edu/
tracreports/terrorism/supp.html (June 17, 2002).
7 See Transactional Records Access Clearing House, International Terrorism Lead
Charge on Prosecutions Filed, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/011203/int-
terfil.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003). The prosecution rate has not increased since Sep-
tember 11, 2001. The "declination rate"-the rate at which federal prosecutors decline to
prosecute terrorism referrals from law enforcement-increased from 37% in 2001 to 55%
in the first six months of 2002. See Transactional Records Access Clearing House, Interna-
tional Terrorism Referrals Acted Upon: Prosecuted or Declined Fiscal Years 1997-2002, at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/supp/intterpctdec9702.html (last visited Apr.
9, 2003).
8 See Transactional Records Access Clearing House, International Terrorism Lead
Charge on Prosecutions Filed, supra note 7. The government apprehends and prosecutes
very few international terrorists during the conspiracy stage-before they pose a real dan-
ger to the United States, its citizens, and its interests abroad. Between 1997 and 2001,
conspiracy was the lead charge in only 1 of the 115 prosecutions for international terror-
ism. See id. The greatest number of prosecutions (36) involved foreign murder of U.S.
nationals and kidnapping or hostage taking. See id. In those cases in which a federal
offense was evident, prosecutors most often cited the "lack of evidence of criminal intent"
or "weak or insufficient admissible evidence" for their failure to prosecute more suspected
international terrorists. Transactional Records Access Clearing House, International Ter-
rorism Referrals Declined by Declination Reason Fiscal Years 2001-2002, at http://
trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/supp/intterpctdec.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
9 See Transactional Records Access Clearing House, Domestic and International Ter-
rorism Disposed of 1997-2001, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/011203/
intdomterdis.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003). The recent arrest of terrorist conspirators in
Singapore suspected of having links with al-Qaeda provides one example of the few suc-
cessful efforts to apprehend terrorists before they attack. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Al
Qaeda's Southeast Asian Reach: Group Operating in 4 Nations Believed Tied to Sept. 11 Hijackers,
WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2002, at Al.
10 See Transactional Records Access Clearing House, Length of Prison Sentences: Fis-
cal Years 1997-2001, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracrepots/terrorism/011203/sentence.html
(last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
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"[t] he gap between the reported investigations and referrals for prose-
cution would appear to document a major challenge facing law en-
forcement in its attempts to prevent terrorism and punish
terrorists." ''
The government's inability to pursue more international terror-
ism prosecution referrals flows directly from federal law enforce-
ment's inability to investigate acts of international terrorism
effectively. Although the federal government is increasing its efforts
to investigate, apprehend, and prosecute suspected international ter-
rorists, 12 the paucity of international assistance prevents law enforce-
ment from effectively monitoring international terrorist networks.' 3
This reality has prompted renewed demands from analysts, 14 policy-
makers,15 and Congress' 6 for greater cooperation between the intelli-
gence community and law enforcement in the war on terrorism.
1 Transactional Records Access Clearing House, Criminal Enforcement Against Ter-
rorists, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/report011203.html (last visited Apr.
9, 2003).
12 See PILLAR, supra note 1, at 80.
13 See infra Part III.A.
14 See, e.g.,Joseph S. Nye, How to Protect the Homeland, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25 2001, at A29
(stating that "the [CIA] and [FBI] must improve their ability to work together on detection
and must reconcile their different authorities and programs in intelligence and law en-
forcement"). Several commentators recently observed that "spies collect information; law
enforcement agents collect evidence. This cultural difference affects the use and effective-
ness of information," and "[t]he gaps separating the two communities cannot be closed
entirely, but they can, and must, be bridged." FrankJ. Cilluffo et al., Tools to Combat Terror-
ism: The Use and Limits of U.S. Intelligence, WAsH. Q., Winter 2002, at 61, 73.
15 In a 1996 speech at Georgetown University on international terrorism, former Di-
rector of Central Intelligence John Deutch described communication between CIA station
chiefs and FBI legal attaches abroad as essential in dealing with the foreign terrorist threat.
SeeJohn Deutch, Address at Georgetown University, Fighting Foreign Terrorism, (Sept. 5,
1996), http://www.cia.gov/cia/publicaffairs/speeches/archives/1996/
dci-speech_090596.htm. In October of 1995, CIA General Counsel Jeffrey H. Smith told
the Senate Select Intelligence Committee that effectively combating transnational threats
requires "effective, extensive and routine cooperation between intelligence and law en-
forcement." John Buntin, Cops and Spies: Federal Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies,
Tired of Bumping into Each Other Overseas, Are Trying to Work Together, Gov'T EXECUTIVE, April
1996, at 40, 41. The Director of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, is seeking to improve
cooperation between the CIA and FBI in investigating international terrorism. See David
Jackson, Ridge Seeks to Boost Nation's Security Budget, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 25, 2002, at
27A. The FBI, aware of the limitations on its ability to conduct effective foreign investiga-
tions of international terrorism, has announced that it must improve relations and intelli-
gence sharing with the intelligence community. See Press Release, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Reorganization of Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters (Dec. 3,
2001), http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel01/reorg120301.htm.
16 Congress amended Rule 6(e)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to
authorize the Department of Justice to share information it uses in criminal prosecutions
with intelligence agencies. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203, 115
Stat. 272, 278 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 401(a)). In addition, Congress has directed
the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that foreign intelligence relating to ter-
rorists' plans is broadly disseminated within the government. See Intelligence Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-108, § 403, 115 Stat. 1394, 1403.
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Despite its necessity, greater cooperation between law enforce-
ment and the intelligence community may undermine the govern-
ment's ability to pursue prosecution referrals of international
terrorists because of the threat that such prosecutions pose to the dis-
closure of classified information. Recognition of the disclosure threat
is evidenced by Department of Justice (DOJ) procedures. Before de-
ciding whether to prosecute a violation of federal law in cases in which
there is a possibility that classified information will be revealed, DOJ
attorneys must consider "the likelihood that classified information will
be revealed if the case is prosecuted" and "the damage to the national
security that might result if classified information is revealed."' 7
Moreover, if the government does bring a prosecution, federal prose-
cutors are obligated to take every step possible to minimize their reli-
ance on classified information.1 8 Recognizing the prominent role of
the intelligence community in the investigation of international ter-
rorism and the disclosure threat posed by criminal prosecutions of
suspected international terrorists in federal courts, President George
W. Bush, shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, author-
ized the creation of military tribunals to prosecute non-U.S. citizens
suspected of engaging in international terrorist activities.1 9 This ac-
tion drew sharp criticism from both liberals and conservatives alike.2 °
17 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATrORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR PROSECUTION INVOLV-
ING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 4-6 (1981).
18 See U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 2052 (2002), http://
www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/crmO2052.htm. The Manual
provides:
[Searching intelligence community files] will be done (1) to assist the pros-
ecutor in drafting his/her case to avoid implicating classified sources and
methods, (2) when legally necessary to ensure that the prosecution team
has met its legal obligations to an indicted defendant, or (3) under certain
circumstances, to provide investigative leads to law enforcement for use in
obtaining other admissible evidence.
Id.
19 See Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). The
President's military order stated that dangers to the safety of the United States and the
nature of international terrorism make it impracticable to apply in military tribunals the
principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in criminal cases tried in
federal courts. See id. § 1 (f). Supporters of the tribunals have articulated various justifica-
tions, including the need to deprive suspected terrorists of a public stage from which to
spew propaganda, the need to protect federal judges and juries from retaliation, and the
need to protect classified information from disclosure. See, e.g., Verne Gay, A World-Class
Headache: Bringing bin Laden to Trial? Bring Aspirin, NEWSDAY, Nov. 29, 2001, at B35; Laura
Ingraham, Military Tribunals Provide Streamlined Justice, USA TODAY, Nov. 26, 2001, at 15A;
Charles Krauthammer, In Defense of Secret Tribunals, TIME, Nov. 26, 2001, at 104. Some even
argue that a secret trial would be the least prejudicial way of trying well-known terrorists
such as Osama bin Laden. See, e.g., Terrorist Trials Best Handled by Military Commissions,
TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 24, 2001, at 18 (quoting an article by Douglas M. Kmiec, Dean of Catho-
lic University of America, appearing in the Wall Street Journal).
20 Columnist William Saire of the New York Times has commented that "we are letting
George W. Bush get away with the replacement of the American rule of law with military
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Some members of Congress have recognized the disclosure threat
posed by federal court prosecutions. For example, Senator Orrin
Hatch of Utah, who compared the need to prevent disclosure of classi-
fied information in the war on terrorism to the need for secrecy dur-
ing World War II, expressed his support for military tribunals:
It is of the utmost importance that no information be permit-
ted to reach the enemy on any of these matters. How the terrorists
were so swiftly apprehended; how our intelligence services are
equipped to work against them; what sources of information we
have inside al Qaeda; who are the witnesses against the terrorists;
how much we have learned about al Qaeda terrorist methods, plans,
programs and the identity of other terrorists who might be or have
been sent to this country; how much we have learned about al
Qaeda weapons, intelligence methods, munitions plants and
morale.
All of the testimony given at trial bears, to some degree, upon
these matters. There is no satisfactory way of censoring and editing
this testimony for the press without revealing, by statement or signif-
icant omission, the answers to many of the questions which may now
be puzzling our enemies. We do not propose to tell our enemies
the answers to the questions which are puzzling them. The only way
not to tell them is not to tell them. The American people will not
insist on acquiring information which by the mere telling would
confer an untold advantage upon the enemy.2 1
The government's recent decision to prosecute suspected interna-
tional terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui in federal court illustrates the ef-
fect that the threat of disclosure has on the government's choice of
forum. Remarking on the government's decision not to prosecute
Moussaoui in a military tribunal, Vice President Cheney told a Wash-
ington Times reporter that the forum decision was "'primarily based on
an assessment [that] the case against Moussaoui ... [could] be han-
dled through the normal criminal justice system without compromis-
ing sources or methods of intelligence.' "22
kangaroo courts." William Safire, SeizingDictatorial Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at A31.
Harvard Law School professor Alan Dershowitz has lamented the "specter of kangaroo
courts" trying suspected-terrorists "in the face of President Bush's tyrannical order." Alan
M. Dershowitz, Military Justice Is to Justice as Military Music Is to Music, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov.
27, 2001, at 34. Trial attorney Gerry Spence has said that military tribunals "would be an
absolute charade." See William Glaberson, Lawyers Say Public Trial Would Make Convicting
bin Laden More Difficult, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at B9.
21 Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terror-
ism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 363-64 (2001) (statement of
Sen. Orrin C. Hatch) (quoting remarks by Franklin Roosevelt's Attorney General, Francis
Biddle).
22 Joseph I. Lieberman, No Excuse for Second-Class Justice, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2002, at
A13 (quoting Vice President Dick Cheney).
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Shortly after the President issued the order authorizing military
tribunals, more than three hundred law professors sent an open letter
to him expressing their opposition to the tribunals and disputing the
order's implicit assumption that federal courts are unable to handle
criminal prosecutions of suspected international terrorists. 23 Indeed,
the United States traditionally has prosecuted violations of its criminal
laws in federal courts. However, in light of the apparent necessity of
extensive interagency (particularly, intelligence community) coopera-
tion for the effective investigation of international terrorism, one
must ask whether critics of President Bush's attempt to remove crimi-
nal prosecutions of suspected international terrorists to an alternative
forum have adequately considered whether federal courts are capable
of entertaining such prosecutions without revealing to the world (and
specifically to international terrorist organizations) the intelligence
community's ability to spy on international terrorist networks. Al-
though federal laws 24 and procedures 25 attempt to protect classified
23 See Katharine Q. Seelye, In Letter, 300 Law Professors Oppose Tribunals Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2001, at B7. David Scheffer, a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute for Peace,
criticized the President's decision to create the military tribunals on the grounds that "[the
United States has] a good track record of successfully prosecuting terrorists in court while
successfully protecting classified information." 'Our Credibility Is on the Line Here', NEWs-
WEEK, Nov. 28, 2001, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/664569.asp. However, the statistical
evidence showing that international terrorists are underprosecuted undermines the force
of this assertion. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
24 Although neither defines what constitutes a source or method, both Executive Or-
der 12,958 and the National Security Act of 1947 provide for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995);
National Security Act of 1947 § 103(c) (6), 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(c) (6) (2000). Executive Or-
der 12,958, which lays out the rules governing the classification of information, authorizes
the President, agency heads, and other presidentially designated officials, as well as officials
who have been delegated authority by agency heads, to classify information. See Exec. Or-
der No. 12,958 § 1.4, 60 Fed. Reg. at 19,827. These officials may categorize information as
top secret, secret, or confidential, depending on whether its unauthorized disclosure could
be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage, serious damage, or damage, respectively,
to national security. See id. § 1.3, 60 Fed. Reg. at 19,826. The National Security Act ex-
empts the CIA from any law that would require the publication or disclosure of the func-
tions, names, official tides, salaries, or numbers of its personnel. See 50 U.S.C. § 4 0 3g.
25 The discovery of classified information by defendants is regulated in part by the
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA). See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2000). Sec-
tion 4 of CIPA, tided "Discovery of classified information by defendants," provides that
"[t]he court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the United States to delete specified
items of classified information from documents to be made available to the defendant
through discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure .... Id. app. 3 § 4.
This provision has been construed not to create "new rights of or limits on discovery of a
specific area of classified information." United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C. Cir.
1989). Rather, the D.C. Circuit has stated, CIPA "contemplates an application of the gen-
eral law of discovery in criminal cases to the classified information area with limitations
imposed based on the sensitive nature of the classified information." Id. Although one
could imagine a situation in which § 4 of CIPA might provide a measure of protection to a
prosecutor seeking to protect classified information in the face of a discovery request for
all Brady material in the government's possession, it is important to note that a § 4 substitu-
tion issue will not arise until after the issue with which this Note is concerned-whether a
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information from unnecessary disclosure, and federal courts tradition-
ally have been sensitive to the necessity of protecting classified infor-
mation from disclosure to defendants, 26 the Supreme Court has
imposed on prosecutors a duty, known as Brady obligations, to disclose
to criminal defendants all exculpatory27 and impeachment 28 material
in the government's possession. In addition, the Supreme Court re-
cently imposed on prosecutors the duty to search for exculpatory or
impeachment evidence not known to or possessed by the prosecution,
but known to others acting on the government's behalf in a particular
case.29 Some courts of appeals have gone so far as to require that
prosecutors search for exculpatory and impeachment material in any
agency with a potential connection to the prosecution's case. 30 Be-
cause disclosure of intelligence community files could reveal the
methods and sources that the government uses to monitor interna-
tional terrorist networks, compelled disclosure of intelligence commu-
nity files relating to targets of criminal investigations could eviscerate
the government's already limited ability to investigate international
terrorism effectively. In light of prosecutors' Brady obligations and of
the unique interagency investigative burden imposed by international
terrorism, it is questionable whether the federal courts are the appro-
priate forum in which to try suspected international terrorists.
This Note argues that federal courts can and must adopt a con-
struction of the Supreme Court's line of Brady cases that limits the
prosecutor's duty to search the intelligence community for exculpa-
tory or impeachment material if the courts are to serve as a viable
prosecutor must search for Brady material possessed by other government entities for
which he might later seek substitution or deletion-is resolved. Therefore, because CIPA
does not bear on the issue of a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material in the posses-
sion of other arms of the federal government, this Note does not discuss the various proce-
dural requirements that the statute imposes on the discovery and introduction of classified
information in criminal prosecutions. For a more detailed discussion of the mechanics of
CIPA, see Saul M. Pilchen & Benjamin B. Klubes, Using the Classified Information Procedures
Act in Criminal Cases: A Primerfor Defense Counsel, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191 (1994); JeffJarvis,
Note, Protecting the Nation 's National Security: The Classified Information Procedures Act, 20 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 319 (1995); TimothyJ. Shea, Note, CIPA Under Siege: The Use and Abuse of
Classified Information in Criminal Trials, 27 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 657 (1990).
26 Cf United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1108 (4th Cir. 1985) (observing that
"[r]evealing [classified] information absent an essential need by a defendant would ...
result in the drying up of a primary source of information to our intelligence
community").
27 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
28 See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972).
29 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438-39 (1995). Stanley Fisher argues that the
Supreme Court's line of Brady cases should be codified in ethical rules so that prosecutors
have an ethical, as well as a constitutional, obligation "to learn of and disclose exculpatory
evidence known to other members of the prosecution team, including law enforcement
agents." Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police
Hands: Lessons from England, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379, 1422-23 (2000).
30 See infra Part II.
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forum for the prosecution of international terrorists. 31 Any standard
regarding the proper scope of the prosecutor's duty to search the gov-
ernment for Brady material must be faithful to the policies underlying
prosecutorial disclosure. Therefore, Part I discusses the doctrinal ba-
sis for the prosecutor's duty to discover and disclose Brady material
within the government's possession and identifies the policies that
prosecutorial disclosure aims to serve. Because the Supreme Court
has not ruled on whether prosecutors must search for Brady material
within government entities that have not engaged in law enforcement
activity under a prosecutor's direction and control, Part II of this Note
reviews the major circuit courts of appeals cases ruling on the prosecu-
tor's duty to search for Brady material not known to or possessed by
him. Part III explains the significance of the government's interest in
preventing disclosure of classified information relating to its investiga-
tion of international terrorism by describing the source of the discov-
ery problem at issue in this Note-namely, the need for extensive
interagency cooperation in the government's investigation of interna-
tional terrorism. This Part also explains why, in the context of a pros-
ecution of an international terrorist, the various circuit approaches
place inadequate limits on the prosecutor's duty to search for Brady
material in the possession of any branch of the federal government.
Part IV of this Note proposes a standard for applying a limited
prosecutorial duty to search other government agencies for Brady ma-
terial. This proposed standard better serves the government's inter-
ests in protecting classified information regarding its investigation of
international terrorism than do the current circuit approaches. This
Part also explains how the proposed standard conforms to existing
Supreme Court case law, and how the standard implements all of the
policies that prosecutorial disclosure is intended to serve.
31 Two commentators appear to disagree, expressly or implicitly, with the assertion
that a prosecutor's duty can be so limited. Jonathan Fredman has argued that a prosecu-
tor's duty to search for Brady material would reach the intelligence community if an intelli-
gence agency were to become aligned with a specific prosecution or if a prosecutor were to
have "reason to believe that a particular intelligence agency [had] any information relating
to a specific defendant or the subject matter of a particular prosecution." SeeJonathan M.
Fredman, Intelligence Agencies, Law Enforcement, and the Prosecution Team, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 331, 370 (1998). Robert Hochman has argued that "[a]nyone who plays a part in
bringing the power of the state to bear on the individual in the form of punishment must
share the responsibility to uncover the truth that comes with that power." Robert Hoch-
man, Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1673, 1692 (1996). This Note seeks to demonstrate that neither of these broad ap-
proaches is compelled by case law.
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SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON THE PROSECUTOR'S
DUTY TO DISCOVER AND DISCLOSE
BRADY MATERIAL
Discovery in federal criminal proceedings has both constitutional
and statutory dimensions. Although defendants have no general con-
stitutional right to discovery in criminal proceedings,32 Congress has
established rules providing for "the minimum amount of discovery to
which the parties are entitled," 33 and the Supreme Court has fash-
ioned "what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally guar-
anteed access to evidence" designed to ensure that criminal
prosecutions comport with due process.3 4 This Part discusses the
prosecutor's constitutional discovery obligations under Brady v. Mary-
land and its progeny,35 paying particular attention to the Court's rea-
sons for imposing the discovery and disclosure obligation and to
Brady's power to compel a prosecutor to search other branches of the
government for exculpatory or impeachment evidence not known to
or possessed by the prosecutor. 36 In doing so, this Part establishes
32 Weathertord v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
33 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1975 Amendment). The criminal
defendant's main statutory discovery devices are Rules 16 and 26.2. See FED. R. CrIM. P. 16,
26.2.
34 United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982).
35 One might wonder why the disclosure problem associated with federal prosecu-
tions of international terrorists is limited to the scope of a prosecutor's obligation to search
other arms of government for Brady material, considering that Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17 permits a defendant to obtain a subpoena to "command each person to
whom it is directed to attend and give testimony at the time and place specified therein,"
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a), or to "command the person to whom it is directed to produce the
books, papers, documents, or other objects designated therein," FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). In
other words, if a defendant can simply subpoena elements of the intelligence community
to discover any exculpatory or impeachment material he believes it might have, why is not
the disclosure problem broader than the scope of Brady's search obligation? The answer is
that a defendant cannot use his power of subpoena in a federal criminal proceeding as a
discovery device. As the Supreme Court stated in Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States:
It was intended by the rules to give some measure of discovery. Rule 16 was
adopted for that purpose....
Rule 16 deals with documents and other materials that are in the pos-
session of the Government and provides how they may be made available to
the defendant for his information .... Rule 16 provides the only way the
defendant can reach such materials so as to inform himself...
... Rule 17(c) was not intended to provide an additional means of
discovery.
341 U.S. 214, 218-20 (1951).
36 Discussion of a federal prosecutor's duty to search other branches of the federal
government for Rule 16 or Jencks Act (Rule 26.2) material is outside the scope of this
Note. However, cases discussing a prosecutor's duty to search for Rule 16 and Jencks Act
materials that he neither has in his possession nor knows of suggest that courts impose the
same search obligation in those contexts as they do in the Brady context. See, e.g., United
States v. Hall, 171 F.3d 1133, 1144-45 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that a prosecutor was not
obligated to disclose medical and psychiatric records relating to a government witness's
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that the prosecutor's duty to discover and disclose Brady material is
intended to implement several policies, including the preservation of
the adversarial system of justice, the prevention of prosecutorial mis-
conduct, the provision of fair trials (i.e., preventing harm to defend-
ants), the promotion of public confidence in criminal convictions,
and the administration of accurate convictions. These are the policies
to be implemented by any standard regarding the prosecution's duty
to search for Brady material that is not within his knowledge or
possession.
A. The Policies Underlying Prosecutorial Disclosure
Because the government has vastly superior investigative re-
sources with which to discover information concerning alleged
crimes,37 and because in most cases exculpatory information in the
testimony in response to a request forJencks Act material because the government did not
possess or control the records); United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that Rule 16 requires disclosure of inmate files if a prosecutor has knowledge of
and access to them, regardless of whether the controlling agency participated in the prose-
cution's investigation); United States v. Dominguez-Villa, 954 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)
(relying on Ninth Circuit Brady cases for the proposition that Rule 16 does not require a
federal prosecutor to disclose personnel files of state law enforcement witnesses); United
States v. Durham, 941 F.2d 858, 860-61 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a federal prosecutor
had no obligation under the Jencks Act to disclose notes taken by a state investigator
during an interview of a witness because the government did not possess the notes);
United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 915, 922 (11 th Cir. 1983) ("A statement is 'in the posses-
sion of the United States' for Jencks Act purposes if it is in the possession of a federal
prosecutorial agency."); Thor v. United States, 574 F.2d 215, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1978) (hold-
ing that the prosecution was not obligated to disclose certain evidence because the evi-
dence was in the possession of county police, not the federal prosecutor). Because the
statutes requiring the prosecution to produce Rule 16 and Jencks Acts material "in the
government's possession" do not define what it means for these materials to be in the
government's possession, see FEn. R. CruM. P. 16, 26, this Note's proposal regarding the
proper scope of a prosecutor's duty to search other arms of the government for Brady
material should be equally applicable in the Rule 16 andJencks Act contexts. But see Peter
J. Henning, Defense Discovery in White Collar Criminal Prosecution, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 601,
616-17 (1999) (arguing that "government" should not mean the same thing under Brady
as it does under Rule 16(a) (1) (C), even though courts often treat these two references as
having equivalent meaning, because (1) disclosure required under Rule 16 is broader than
what is required under Brady; (2) Brady's concern is with prosecutorial suppression, "so it is
logical to focus on what the prosecutor knows or should know that might impact on the
fairness of the trial"; and (3) compelling a prosecutor to search the government for excul-
patory or impeachment material imposes an unfair burden on government).
37 See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecu-
torsDoJustice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 76 (1991) (observing that "[p]rosecutors' offices rarely
have manpower advantages that would undermine adversarial equality" but that "they do
have material resources unavailable to the defense," such as "[t]he ability to employ police
as investigators, use grand jury subpoena power to force cooperation of witnesses, time
indictments, consult the government's vast forensic services and computer records, and
appeal to jurors' natural fear of crime[, of which] all contribute to prosecutorial effective-
ness"). Federal agencies employed almost 90,000 full-time investigative personnel author-
ized to make arrests and carry firearms as of 2000. Bureau ofJustice Statistics, U.S. Dep't
of justice, Federal Law Enforcement Statistics, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/fedle.htm
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prosecution's possession will be unknown to defense counsel, H one of
the most valuable rights that a criminal defendant enjoys is his consti-
tutional right to all evidence in the government's possession that is
material either to his guilt or punishment."9 The Court in Brady v.
Maryland4l' imposed on prosecutors the duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence. The prosecution charged the defendant in that case, Brady,
with first degree murder.4' Brady defended on the theory that, al-
though he had participated in the crime, he had not killed the vic-
tim. 42 Prior to trial, Brady requested that the prosecution permit his
counsel to examine the extrajudicial statements of his alleged accom-
plice, Boblit.43 The prosecution complied by making some of Boblit's
statements available to Brady's attorney, but it withheld one statement
it possessed-and of which it was aware-in which Boblit admitted to
committing the homicide. 44 Brady learned of the statement after he
had been tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for first-degree
murder.4 5 The Supreme Court held that the suppression of Boblit's
statement was a violation of Brady's due process rights, stating that,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution, "the
suppression ... of evidence favorable to an accused upon request vio-
lates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment.
'
"
4 6
The Court's minimal discussion of its rationale left much to be
inferred. It stated generally that due process requires the disclosure
(last revised July 17, 2001). All state and local law enforcement agencies combined em-
ployed over 1,000,000 full-time investigative personnel. See Bureau ofJustice Statistics, U.S.
Dep't ofJustice, State and Local Law Enforcement Statistics, at http://www.ojp.usdoi.gov/
bjs/sandlle.htm (last revised Jan. 29, 2003).
" See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
"' A detailed discussion of all the nuances of prosecutors' Brady obligations is unnec-
essary for the purposes of this Note. For such a discussion, see 25JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORF's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 616.06 (3d ed. 1997) and Christopher P. DelRosso & Samuel
F. Ernst, Discovery, Thirteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 89 GEO. L.J. 1343, 1343-56
(2001). For a succinct discussion of Brady and its doctrinal basis, see Victor Bass, Com-
ment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 112, 112-15
(1972) and Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74
YALE L.J. 136 (1964).
40 See 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
41 See id. at 84.
42 See id.
43 Id.
44 Id. The Supreme Court's opinion states that the prosecution's suppression of the
statement was not done with "guile." See id. at 84, 88.
45 See id. at 84.
46 Id. at 87. In Giglio v. United States, the Court subsequently ruled that impeachment
evidence is covered by the Brady disclosure obligation, stating that "[w]hen the 'reliability
of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evi-
dence affecting credibility falls within this general rule." 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (quot-
ing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)); see also infra notes 83-89 and
accompanying text (discussing the Giglio case).
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obligation, and that non-disclosure violates due process because it
produces unjust and unfair trials.47 Speaking to its decision's doctri-
nal basis, the Brady Court stated that its holding was an extension of its
prior decision in Mooney v. Holohan, a case involving deliberate
prosecutorial suppression of impeachment evidence in which the
Court stated that a conviction contrived through "the pretense of a
trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of
liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury . . . is ...
inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice. ' '4 Justifying its
extension of Mooney to cases of inadvertent suppression, 49 such as the
suppression at issue in Brady, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
observed that:
The principle of Mooney ... is not punishment of society for mis-
deeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the ac-
cused. Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when
criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice
suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.50
Because the Brady obligation is designed to ensure that defendants
receive fair trials, a prosecutor's good or bad faith in suppressing evi-
dence is, as the Court observed, irrelevant.5'
Despite its repeated references to fairness and justice, the Brady
opinion did not state clearly why prosecutorial nondisclosure is unfair
to defendants. Does unfairness arise because of prosecutorial miscon-
duct? In other words, does it stem from a prosecutor's failure to ob-
serve a procedural rule or from his engagement in arbitrary conduct?
Does the unfairness stem from some evidentiary advantage that non-
disclosure gives to a prosecutor? Does the unfairness derive from
some fraud committed upon the court or upon the defendant? Al-
though the Court answered none of these questions directly, its opin-
ion suggests that it understood a "fair trial" to be a trial in which a
court is not deceived by a prosecutor, the prosecutor engages in no
misconduct, and the resulting conviction is accurate. For example,
the Court's reliance on Mooney, a misconduct case, indicates that it
47 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
48 See id. at 86 (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)). In Mooney,
the prosecuting state attorney intentionally suppressed evidence concerning the credibility
of every government witness. See 294 U.S. at 110, 112-13. Mooney, a radical labor leader
and accused anarchist, claimed that the prosecutor fabricated his entire case and alleged
that his conviction was based on perjured testimony "which was knowingly used by the
prosecuting authorities in order to obtain that conviction, and also that these authorities
deliberately suppressed evidence which would have impeached and refuted the testimony
thus given against him." Id. at 110. The Brady Court also relied on Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S.
213 (1942), another case involving deliberate suppression. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 86.
49 See supra note 44.
50 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
51 See id.
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was concerned partially with preventing prosecutorial misconduct. 52
In addition, the language it used suggests that the Court was con-
cerned also with public perceptions of trial fairness: the Court ob-
served that the disclosure rule sought to prevent a prosecutor from
being cast in the "role of an architect of a proceeding that does not
comport with standards of justice. ' 53 Moreover, the irrelevance of a
prosecutor's good or bad faith under Brady and the requirement that
the suppressed evidence be material of guilt or punishment suggest
that the Court understood fairness in terms of the accuracy of the trial
outcome. Why else would the Court limit a prosecutor's disclosure
obligation to evidence material to guilt or punishment if clearly, one
may assume, a defendant would be harmed if he were denied the op-
portunity to exploit every piece of favorable (though not material) evi-
dence in the prosecution's possession?
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has infrequently and
only briefly spoken to Brady's purpose. Nevertheless, its subsequent
Brady cases indicate that disclosure is designed to implement a variety
of policies. In its 1976 United States v. Agurs decision, a case involving a
prosecutor's deliberate failure to disclose Brady material in his actual
possession, 54 the Court characterized Brady as a mechanism for
preventing harm to defendants: "Although in Mooney [upon which
Brady relied] the Court had been primarily concerned with the willful
misbehavior of the prosecutor, in Brady the Court focused on the
harm to the defendant resulting from nondisclosure.5 5 Although
this statement emphasizes the policy of preventing harm to defend-
ants, the opinion's discussion of prosecutorial integrity suggests that
the Agurs Court understood fairness also in terms of preventing
prosecutorial misconduct:
For though the attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the ac-
cused with earnestness and vigor, he must always be faithful to his
client's overriding interest that 'justice shall be done." He is the
"servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer."56
52 See supra text accompanying note 48.
53 Brady, 373 U.S. at 88. The Court quoted a portion of an address by former Solicitor
General Simon E. Sobeloff:
The Solicitor General is not a neutral, he is an advocate; but an advocate
for a client whose business is not merely to prevail in the instant case. My
client's chief business is not to achieve victory but to establish justice. We
are constantly reminded of the now classic words penned by one of my
illustrious predecessors, Frederick William Lehmann, that the Government
wins its point when justice is done in its courts.
Id. at 87 n.2.
54 427 U.S. 97, 100-01, 106-07 (1976).
55 Id. at 104 n.10.
56 Id. at 110-111 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
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Moreover, the Court's desire to implement the policy of ensuring the
accuracy of convictions presumably served as the basis for Agurs's con-
clusion that there is no difference between cases in which the defense
has made merely a general request for exculpatory evidence and cases
in which the defense has made no request for exculpatory evidence. 57
The Supreme Court expressed its understanding that disclosure
functions also to ensure the accuracy of criminal convictions in its
1985 United States v. Bagley decision, a case in which the Court dis-
cussed the materiality limitation on the prosecutor's duty to disclose
Brady material.58 Although Bagley recognized that justice requires dis-
closure,59 the Court nevertheless pointed out that the disclosure obli-
gation has its limits: "[T]he prosecutor is not required to deliver his
entire file to defense counsel"60 because "[Brady's] purpose is not to
displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is
uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not oc-
cur."61 Thus, fairness to defendants, as understood by the Bagley
Court, does not require that the prosecution turn over to the defen-
dant every possible piece of evidence that might assist him in prepar-
ing his defense. Rather, a prosecutor need turn over only material
evidence, 62 and "evidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."63 The Court's
belief that a defendant can receive a fair trial even if a prosecutor
were to suppress non-outcome-determinative evidence suggests that
57 See id. at 106-07. The Court noted that
if there is a duty to respond to a general request .... it must derive from
the obviously exculpatory character of certain evidence in the hands of the
prosecutor. But if the evidence is so clearly supportive of a claim of inno-
cence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to produce, that duty
should equally arise even if no request is made.
Id. at 107.
58 473 U.S. 667, 678-684 (1985). As it had in prior opinions, the Court also focused
on the prosecutorial role that Brady envisions, observing that "the Brady rule represents a
limited departure from a pure adversary model" and that "the prosecutor's role transcends
that of an adversary: he 'is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but thatjustice shall be done." Id. at 675 n.6 (alterations in original) (quoting Berger
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). The prosecutor in Bagley failed to disclose im-
peachment evidence to the defense following a specific request. See id. at 669-70, 676.
59 See id. at 674-75.
60 Id. at 675.
61 Id. The Court reaffirmed the prosecutor's sole authority to make disclosure deter-
minations under Brady in its 1987 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie decision, in which it stated that
"[d]efense counsel has no constitutional right to conduct his own search of the State's files
[for Brady material]" because "it is the State that decides which information must be dis-
closed" and "the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is final." 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987).
62 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678.
63 Id. at 682. The Court defined a "reasonable probability" as "a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.
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the purpose of disclosure is served so long as convictions are adminis-
tered accurately. 64
The Supreme Court's recent Kyles v. Whitley decision spoke of
Brady disclosure as a method of both ensuring public confidence in
criminal convictions and promoting the accuracy of criminal convic-
tions. 65 The Court expressed its concern for promoting public confi-
dence in criminal convictions through disclosure by stating that
"[Brady] disclosure will serve to justify trust in the prosecutor as 'the
representative ... of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done.' "6,, The Kyles Court added that:
[u] nless ... the adversary system of prosecution is to descend to a
gladiatorial level unmitigated by any prosecutorial obligation for
the sake of truth, the government simply cannot avoid responsibility
for knowing when the suppression of evidence has come to portend
such an effect on a trial's outcome as to destroy confidence in its
result.6 7
Moreover, Kyles's observation that "[Brady disclosure] will tend to pre-
serve the criminal trial, as distinct from the prosecutor's private delib-
erations, as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about
criminal accusations" 6 expressed the Court's understanding that
Brady disclosure is also designed to serve the policy of assuring the
accurate administration of convictions.
The Court's concern for implementing Brady in a way that pre-
serves the adversarial system of justice is not a subject of great discus-
sion in its Brady opinions, but it is nonetheless present throughout its
opinions. For example, the Court stated in Kyles that "[w] e have never
held that the Constitution demands an open file policy," 69 in Penn-
sylvania v. Ritchie that "[a] defendant's right to discover exculpatory
64 Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion recognized the limitation that the majority's
materiality requirement placed on the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial, ob-
serving that
the Brady decision, the reasoning that underlay it, and the fundamental
interest in a fair trial, combine to give the criminal defendant the right to
receive from the prosecutor, and the prosecutor the affirmative duty to
turn over to the defendant, all information known to the government that
might reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant's case.
Id. at 695-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65 See 514 U.S. 419, 454 (1995).
66 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439 (alteration in original) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). The three significant Supreme Cotrt opinions preceding Kyles that
relied on Brady-Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987), Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S.
786, 794-95 (1972), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)-provide little or
no discussion of Brady's purpose.
67 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439.
68 Id. at 440.
69 Id. at 437.
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evidence does not include the unsupervised authority to search
through the Commonwealth's files," 70 and in Agurs that "we have re-
jected the suggestion that the prosecutor has a constitutional duty
routinely to deliver his entire file to defense counsel." 71 Why this limi-
tation? In part, as the Court observed in Bagley, because it serves to
preserve the adversarial system of justice: "[Brady's] purpose is not to
displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is
uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage ofjustice does not occur.
Thus, the prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to de-
fense counsel .... "72
In summary, this subpart's discussion indicates that, taken to-
gether, the Brady line of opinions reflects the Court's understanding
that disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment evidence is intended
to implement several policies, including the preservation of the adver-
sarial system of justice, the prevention of prosecutorial misconduct,
the provision of fair trials (i.e., preventing harm to defendants), the
promotion of public confidence in criminal convictions, and the ad-
ministration of accurate convictions.
B. The Doctrinal Basis for the Prosecutor's Duty to Search for
Brady Material
As the previous subpart indicates, Brady forbids a prosecutor from
suppressing evidence favorable to the accused.73 Subsequent Su-
preme Court cases recast the prosecutor's obligation as the duty to
turn over evidence in the government's possession that is both
favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment.7 4
Under either formulation, possession and notice of Brady material are
implicit preconditions to the disclosure duty. In Brady, the prosecu-
tion withheld from the defendant exculpatory material in its posses-
sion of which it was aware. 75 However, does a prosecutor commit a
Brady violation if she fails to disclose exculpatory material in her pos-
session but of which she is unaware? Does a prosecutor commit a vio-
lation if she fails to disclose exculpatory material not in her possession
but of which she is aware? What if a prosecutor fails to disclose excul-
patory information that is within neither her possession nor knowl-
edge? Subsequent Supreme Court opinions construing Brady,
discussed in this subpart, provide some guidance regarding the de-
gree of prosecutorial knowledge and possession of exculpatory mate-
70 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 59.
71 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, Il (1976).
72 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
73 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
74 See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 674-76.
75 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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rial necessary for the imposition of a prosecutorial disclosure
obligation. Because these cases describe the circumstances under
which the courts will impute knowledge or possession of Brady mate-
rial to a prosecutor, they implicitly set out the scope of the prosecu-
tor's duty to search for Brady material.
The simplest Brady violation one can imagine involves a prosecu-
tor's intentional failure to disclose exculpatory material to the defen-
dant that is within the prosecutor's actual possession and
knowledge. 76 In fact, the exculpatory or impeachment materials sup-
pressed in Agurs, Moore v. Illinois, and Brady all were within the actual
possession of a prosecutor.77 Thus, none of those opinions went so
far as to hold that the prosecution has a duty to disclose any exculpa-
tory or impeachment material not within its possession but neverthe-
less possessed by some arm of the government.78 However, although
an implicit precondition to any duty to disclose under Brady is that the
prosecution have notice of its possession of evidence materially
favorable to the defendant, a prosecutor's disclosure obligations are
not limited to materials close to her or well known to her-that is, to
materials within her actual possession or knowledge. Instead, as the
Supreme Court has held in a line of cases, including Giglio v. United
States,79 Bagley,"" Ritchie,"' and Kyles,8 2 a prosecutor's disclosure obliga-
tions extend also to exculpatory material not known to or possessed by
her but possessed by other members of a prosecutor's office or by the
law enforcement entity that investigated the particular crime on the
prosecutor's behalf.
The imputed knowledge doctrine finds its basis in Giglio, a case in
which the defendant was convicted of passing forged money orders
76 The paradigmatic situation occurs where a prosecutor intentionally withholds in-
formation supporting a defendant's sole defense simply because the defendant did not
specifically request Brady material. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 100-01.
77 See id. at 100-01, 106-07; Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 791-95 (1972); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963).
78 In fact, the entire Agurs opinion refers to exculpatory information in the hands of
the prosecutor. The Agurs Court began its discussion of Brady by stating that "[t]he rule of
Brady v. Maryland arguably applies in three quite different situations. Each involves the
discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but uin-
known to the defense." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 (citation omitted). The Agurs Court
couched in the following language its holding that the Brady analysis does not vary depend-
ing on whether the defense's request is general or whether there is a request at all: "[A
general] request ... gives the prosecutor no better notice than if no request is made. If
there is a duty to respond to a general request . . . , it must derive from the obviously
exculpatory character of certain evidence in the hands of the prosecutr" d. at 106-07 (em-
phasis added).
79 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
8o 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
91 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
82 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
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and sentenced to five years in prison.83 At trial, Taliento, Giglio's al-
leged but unindicted co-conspirator, testified that Giglio instigated
the criminal scheme.84 Taliento was the federal government's only
witness linking Giglio to the charged offense.8 5 During cross-examina-
tion, defense counsel unsuccessfully sought to discredit Taliento's tes-
timony by attempting to reveal possible agreements with the
government for prosecutorial leniency.86 While the appeal was pend-
ing, defense counsel discovered that the prosecutor had failed to dis-
close impeachment evidence to the defense-specifically, a promise
to Taliento, recorded in an affidavit by an Assistant U.S. Attorney,
DiPaola, that if Taliento testified before the grandjury and at trial he
would not be prosecuted for his participation in the scheme.8 7
DiPaola had presented the government's case to the grand jury, but
the case was tried by another Assistant U.S. Attorney who had filed an
affidavit with the court and stated in his summation that the govern-
ment had made no promise of immunity to Taliento.88 Although the
Assistant U.S. Attorney who actually tried the case and who presuma-
bly would have been responsible for Brady disclosure apparently had
no knowledge of the impeachment material, the Court nevertheless
found a Brady violation: "A promise made by one attorney must be
attributed, for... [Brady] purposes, to the Government."8 9 Thus was
born the doctrine of imputed knowledge of Brady material.
In United States v. Bagley, the Court applied this constructive
knowledge/possession doctrine to evidence known only to and pos-
sessed by the investigative arm of a prosecutor's office. 90 In that case,
the federal government convicted the defendant, Bagley, of narcotics
offenses principally on the testimony of two witnesses.91 Prior to trial,
Bagley requested that the prosecutor disclose materials relating to
"any deals, promises, or inducements made to witnesses in exchange
for their testimony."92 The prosecution disclosed no material relating
to any such promises.93 Three years after his conviction, Bagley made
a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act of
1974, in response to which he received copies of form contracts be-
tween the government's two witnesses and the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco and Firearms (ATF)-the law enforcement entity that
83 Giglio, 405 U.S. at 150.
84 Id. at 151.
85 Id.
86 See id. at 151-52.
87 Id. at 150-51.
88 Id. at 151-52.
89 Id. at 154.
90 See 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
91 See id. at 669-71, 673.
92 Id. at 669-70.
93 See id. at 669-71.
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apparently investigated Bagley on behalf of the prosecution 94-for the
purchase of information related to Bagley's violations.95 In the suit to
vacate his sentence, the Assistant U.S. Attorney who prosecuted Bagley
stated that he had not known that the contracts existed and that he
would have disclosed them to Bagley had he know of them.96 Al-
though the Court did not discuss the reasons for its implicit extension
of Brady to materials outside the prosecutor's possession, the Court,
relying on Brady, Agurs, and Moore97 -three cases involving suppres-
sion of exculpatory or impeachment material within the actual posses-
sion of a prosecutor 98-found error in the nondisclosure because "the
prosecutor failed to disclose evidence that the defense might have
used to impeach the Government's witnesses," 99 even though the
Court appears to have acknowledged that the prosecution was una-
ware of and never possessed the suppressed evidence. °0 The Bagley
Court thus construed Brady to extend a prosecutor's disclosure obliga-
tion to materials possessed by other branches of the government-
specifically, a prosecutor's investigative arm.
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the Supreme Court implicitly extended
the scope of the prosecution's Brady disclosure obligation to material
possessed by a non-law-enforcement investigative branch of govern-
ment.10' In Ritchie, the government charged the defendant, Ritchie,
with rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corrup-
tion of a minor.11 2 Prior to trial, Ritchie subpoenaed the Pennsylvania
Children and Youth Services (CYS), a non-law-enforcement protective
service agency responsible under Pennsylvania law for investigating
cases of suspected mistreatment and neglect,'1°- for files related to his
94 See id. at 670-71.
95 See id.
96 Id. at 671 n.4.
97 See id. at 674-78.
98 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
99 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676. The Court's understanding of the broad scope of the Brady
obligation is further reflected inJustice White's concurring opinion, in which he referred
to suppression &y the government rather than specifically to suppression by the prosecution.
Justice White stated that "[Bagley] is not entitled to have his conviction overturned unless
he can show that the evidence withheld by the government was 'material."' Id. at 685 (White,
J., concurring) (emphasis added).
1oo Id. at 671 n.4. The Court remanded the case for consideration of whether the trial
would have been different had the prosecution disclosed the Brady material. Id. at 684.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor's failure to disclose the con-
tracts between the witnesses and the ATF required reversal of Bagley's narcotics conviction.
See Bagley v. Lumpkin, 798 F.2d 1297, 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1986). Bagley nonetheless
served time for the firearms conviction that the two witnesses helped secure. See United
States v. Bagley, 659 F. Supp. 223, 229 (W.D. Wash. 1987).
101 See 480 U.S. 39, 58 (1987).
102 Id. at 43.
103 Id. The police apparently did not conduct such investigations but instead referred
child mistreatment and neglect matters to CYS for investigation. See id.
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prosecution.1 0 4 Ritchie believed that the files contained names of
favorable witnesses as well as other unspecified exculpatory informa-
tion, including a medical report.1 0 5 CYS refused to provide the
files, 0 6 and Ritchie was convicted and sentenced to three to ten years
in prison. 0 7 Although the Court acknowledged that the prosecutor
neither had access to the files nor was aware of their contents,"", the
Court ordered the files turned over to the trial judge for in camera
review on the ground that Ritchie was entitled to any Brady informa-
tion contained in them. 1° 9 Relying on Brady and Agurs, the Supreme
Court stated broadly that "[i] t is well settled that the government has the
obligation to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable
to the accused and material to guilt or punishment."' 10 The Ritchie
Court, without discussing the relationship between CYS and the prose-
cutor in this particular case, thus appeared to implicitly extend a pros-
ecutor's duty to search for Brady material to reach exculpatory or
impeachment material not known to him, possessed by him, or even
possessed by law enforcement agencies assisting in a particular
prosecution.
Implicit in the Supreme Court's constructive knowledge and pos-
session cases is the belief that due process is offended if a prosecutor
fails to search for Brady material not known to him but possibly pos-
sessed by some arm of the government involved in the investigation of
a defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct."'I In its 1995 Kyles v. Whitly
decision, the Supreme Court finally expressly imposed on prosecutors
a limited duty to search for Brady material not known to or possessed
by them. 12 The defendant in that case, Kyles, was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to death primarily on the testimony of
four witnesses. 1 3 In his defense, Kyles argued that the government's
informant had framed him. 114 Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a
lengthy motion for Brady material, to which the state prosecutor re-
sponded that he neither possessed nor had knowledge of any exculpa-
104 Id. Pennsylvania law provided for the confidentiality of all reports and other infor-
mation obtained in the course of a CYS investigation, subject to a certain number of excep-
tions. Id. One of those exceptions permitted CYS records to be revealed to law
enforcement officials for use in criminal investigations. Id. at 43 n.2.
105 Id. at 44.
106 See id.
107 Id. at 45.
108 Id. at 44 n.4.
109 Id. at 61.
110 Id. at 57 (emphases added).
111 In Ritchie and Bagley, the Court implicitly imposed a disclosure obligation on mate-
rial of which the prosecution has constructive possession. See supra notes 90-110 and ac-
companying text.
112 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995).
113 Id. at 423, 429-31.
114 Id. at 429.
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tory evidence." 15 During the appeal, it was discovered that the
prosecutor failed to turn over impeachment evidence to the defense,
including the witnesses' contemporaneous statements to the police,
records of police conversations with the government's informant, and
information linking the government's informant to other crimes. '1 6
The prosecution argued on appeal that it had no knowledge of the
Brady material held by the police-the prosecutor's investigative arm
in the case-and that it should not be held accountable for evidence
known only to police investigators.' 17 The Court acknowledged that
"police investigators sometimes fail to inform a prosecutor of all they
know," but nevertheless refused to accommodate the State's position,
which the Court understood as "a plea to substitute the police for the
prosecutor, and even for the courts themselves, as the final arbiters of
the government's obligation to ensure fair trials," because to do so
would "amount to a serious change of course from the Brady line of
cases."1 18 Relying solely on Brady, the Court held that the "prosecutor
has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others act-
ing on the government's behalf in the case, including the police." '1 9
115 Id. at 428.
116 Id. at 428-29, 431.
117 Id. at 437-38. At oral argument before the Supreme Court, however, the state
"retreated from this suggestion..., conceding that the State is 'held to a disclosure stan-
dard based on what all State officers at the time knew."' Id. at 438 n.ll (quoting Tr. of
Oral Arg. at 40).
118 Id. at 438.
119 Id. at 437. Remarking on the administrative burden imposed by such a search duty,
the Court, relying on Giglio, observed that "'procedures and regulations can be established
to carry [the prosecutor's] burden."' Id. at 438 (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 154 (1972)).
The Court subsequently applied Kyles in Strickler v. Greene, a case in which the defen-
dant, Strickler, was convicted of abduction, robbery, and murder, and was sentenced to
death. See 527 U.S. 263, 266, 276-77 (1999). Prior to trial, the prosecutor gave defense
counsel full access to his case files, id. at 276 n.13, so Strickler made no pretrial motion for
Brady material. Id. at 276. At trial, the State's only witness to the abduction was a woman
named Stoltzfis. See id. at 273. During federal habeas proceedings following Strickler's
conviction, the federal district court permitted Strickler to examine all police and prosecu-
tion files, in which he discovered eight exhibits (documents prepared by Stoltzfus and
notes of police interviews with her) that impeached significant portions of Stoltzfus's testi-
mony. Id. at 273-75, 278. The Court accepted the state attorney's concession that five of
the exhibits were not in his files, which the Court attributed to the fact that Strickler was
tried in Augusta County, Virginia, where the victim's body was found, though the criminal
investigation was conducted by authorities in Rockingham County, Virginia, where the vic-
tim was abducted. Id. at 266-69, 275 n.12. However, the Court refused to accept the pros-
ecutor's lack of knowledge regarding the five exhibits as an excuse and, relying on Brady
and Kyles, held that "the prosecutor is responsible for 'any favorable evidence known to the
others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police.' Thus, the
[government], through its prosecutor, is charged with knowledge of the Stoltzfus materials
for purposes of Brady v. Maryland." Id. at 275 n.12 (citations omitted) (quoting Kyles, 514
U.S at 437).
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II
THE CIRCUIT APPROACHES TO THE PROSECUTOR'S DUTY TO
SEARCH THE GOVERNMENT FOR BRADY MATERIAL
As discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court decision in Kyles ex-
pressly stated that the prosecution has a duty to search for Brady
materials known to others acting on the government's behalf in a par-
ticular case. 120 However, the Kyles Court, which had before it
prosecutorial failure to discover Brady material known to and pos-
sessed by a police department that conducted the prosecutor's investi-
gation, did not explain what kinds of relationships with the
prosecution rise to the level of "acting on the government's behalf."
This Part describes the different standards that the federal courts of
appeals have applied-both before and after Kyles-when evaluating a
prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material, several of which could
be applied to determine the scope of a federal prosecutor's duty to
search the intelligence community for exculpatory or impeachment
material in prosecutions of international terrorists. As this Part indi-
cates, the most government friendly approach-a pre-Kyles ap-
proach-has held that prosecutors have no duty to seek information
not in their actual possession or knowledge,121 while the most liberal
approach could be construed to impose on prosecutors a duty to
make a thorough inquiry of all enforcement agencies that have a po-
tential connection with the prosecution's case.122 Although the circuit
courts generally provide little or no rationale in these cases for the
extension of Brady to evidence not known to or possessed by a prose-
cutor, this Part discusses any explanation that they do provide. The
scant reasoning provided by the circuits indicate that the courts of
appeals share no common understanding regarding the policies that
the Brady disclosure obligation is designed to serve, a conclusion
which this Note discusses in Part IV.
A. The "Prosecution Team" Standard
The approach most commonly applied by the circuits to deter-
mine the scope of a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material not
within his actual possession or knowledge is the "prosecution team"
standard. As this subpart demonstrates, the circuits that have applied
the prosecution team standard have not, however, consistently re-
solved various issues that the standard raises. For example, the cir-
cuits do not agree as to whether a prosecutor's duty to search for
Brady material extends to entities that have no interest in the prosecu-
120 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
121 See infra notes 222-29 and accompanying text.
122 See infra note 186.
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tion, whether the duty extends only to law enforcement entities,
whether it extends only to persons acting under the direction or con-
trol of the prosecutor, and whether the duty extends to Brady material
outside of a prosecutor's jurisdiction.
The prosecution team standard finds its roots in the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision in United States v. Antone.123 The criminal prosecutions
and convictions in Antone were the end product of ajoint investigation
undertaken by federal and state law enforcement officials to solve the
murder of a Florida police officer. 124 While appeals from the convic-
tions were pending, the defendants learned that the federal prosecu-
tor had failed to discover and disclose the fact that a state law
enforcement agency had paid for the principal government witness's
attorney.125 The federal government argued on appeal that the prose-
cutor's nondisclosure was not a Brady violation because the two investi-
gative teams in the case represented entirely separate sovereigns, and
because the knowledge of the state investigators should not be im-
puted to the federal prosecutor. 126 Although the Fifth Circuit held
that the suppressed evidence was not material enough to permit it to
find a Brady violation, the court nonetheless imputed the state investi-
gators' knowledge to the federal prosecutor, stating that "extensive
cooperation between the investigative agencies convinces us that the
knowledge of the state team that [the government witness's] lawyer
was paid from state funds must be imputed to the federal team." 127 In
response to the government's separate-sovereign arguments, the court
remarked that "[ilmposing a rigid distinction between federal and
state agencies which have cooperated intimately from the outset of an
investigation would artificially contort the determination of what is
mandated by due process."'121 The Fifth Circuit relied on the fact that
"the two governments, state and federal, pooled their investigative en-
ergies to a considerable extent"' 29 and that "[t]he entire [investiga-
tive] effort was marked by this spirit of cooperation[,] and state
officers were important witnesses in the federal prosecution."'130 An-
tone thus held that a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material
123 603 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1979).
124 Id. at 568.
125 Id. at 567-68. Because the joint investigative team was concerned that someone
might attempt to hire counsel for the indigent witness in an attempt to hamper the investi-
gation, state law enforcement officials secretly obtained and paid for the witness's attorney.
Id. at 568.
126 Id. at 569. The same-sovereign approach advocated by the prosecutor has been
applied in the First, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. See infra notes 210-21 and accompanying
text.
127 Antone, 603 F.2d at 570.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 569.
1,o Id.
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extends to material that might be held by members of the "prosecu-
tion team," a term which, in light of the facts of the case, encompasses
(1) law enforcement personnel or entities (2) that provide investiga-
tive and, possibly, trial assistance (3) as a result of having cooperated
extensively and intimately with the prosecutor (4) from the outset (5)
of a particular criminal investigation.' 3'
The Seventh Circuit applied the prosecution team standard in
United States ex rel. Smith v. Fairman, a case in which the defendant,
convicted of attempted murder and attempted armed robbery, chal-
lenged the prosecution's failure to discover and disclose exculpatory
material held by the prosecutor's law enforcement investigative arm-
the police-that could have been used to impeach the credibility of
one of the government's two key witnesses. 132 The prosecution ar-
gued on appeal that no Brady violation had occurred because the
prosecutor had no knowledge or possession of the material. 133 Find-
ing that the prosecution had indeed suppressed evidence, the Seventh
Circuit observed that suppression may occur "when the withheld evi-
dence is under the control of a state instrumentality closely aligned
with the prosecution, such as the police."' 3 4 The Seventh Circuitjusti-
fied its prosecution team approach by recalling Brady's purpose, stat-
ing that "Brady was aimed at ensuring that an accused receives a fair
trial rather than punishing the prosecutor for failing to disclose excul-
patory evidence," 135 and that "the purposes of Brady would not be
served by allowing material exculpatory evidence to be withheld sim-
ply because the police, rather than the prosecutors, are responsible
for the nondisclosure."' 36
131 Antone framed the issue in terms of the scope of the prosecutor's imputed knowl-
edge of, rather than the scope of the prosecutor's duty to search for, Brady material. How-
ever, implicit in a ruling that places certain Brady material within a prosecutor's imputed
knowledge is the imposition of an obligation to search for that material.
The Fifth Circuit subsequently relied on the prosecution team standard in Freeman v.
Georgia, in which it found a Brady violation when a prosecutor failed to disclose that a
police officer had deliberately concealed a key witness. 599 F.2d 65, 69-70 (5th Cir. 1979).
The Freeman court reasoned that "when an investigating police officer willfully and inten-
tionally conceals material information, regardless of his motivation and the otherwise
proper conduct of the state attorney, the policeman's conduct must be imputed to the
state as part of the prosecution team." Id. at 69. However, the Fifth Circuit has not consist-
ently applied the prosecution team standard in Brady cases following Antone. See infra notes
193-200 and accompanying text.
132 769 F.2d 386, 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1985).
133 See id. at 391.
134 Id. The prosecution's law enforcement investigative arm-the police-appears to
have provided the prosecutor's sole investigative and trial assistance in the criminal investi-
gation of the defendant, Smith. Though the opinion does not explicitly address the point,
there is no reason to doubt that the police cooperated extensively and intimately with the
prosecutor from the outset of the investigation. See id. at 388-89.
135 Id. at 392.
136 Id. at 391-92.
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The Seventh Circuit again applied the prosecution team standard
in its post-Kyles United States v. Morris decision. 13 7 Morris involved evi-
dence possessed not by the police but by federal agencies investigating
the defendants' alleged unlawful conduct in an unrelated investiga-
tion. 138 The defendants in Morris were charged and convicted of vari-
ous counts of mail and wire fraud, based mostly on the testimony of a
former bank officer who had pled guilty to involvement in the unlaw-
ful scheme and had agreed to cooperate with the government. 39 Ap-
parently unbeknownst to the prosecution, three federal agencies-the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)-had conducted
their own investigations separate and apart from the Department of
Justice's criminal investigation. 140 After their convictions, the defend-
ants alleged that the prosecutor had committed a Brady violation by
failing to disclose materials possessed by the three separate federal
agencies, specifically an OTS deposition of the government's key wit-
ness, SEC questionnaires of purchasers defrauded under the unlawful
scheme, and IRS documents relating to the tax implications of trans-
actions used to implement the unlawful scheme. 14 The Seventh Cir-
cuit refused to rule that a Brady violation had occurred, holding that
the prosecutor had no duty to seek out Brady material from the OTS,
SEC, or IRS because "those agencies were [not] part of the team that
investigated this case or participated in its prosecution.' ' 42 Character-
izing its decision in Fairman and the Supreme Court's decision in Kyles
as "prosecution team" cases, the Seventh Circuit observed that
"neither Kyles nor Fairman can be read as imposing a duty on the pros-
ecutor's office to learn of information possessed by other government
agencies that have no involvement in the investigation or prosecution
at issue."'1 43
The Ninth Circuit also has applied the prosecution team stan-
dard to determine the scope of a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady
material, though its decisions appear to relax the requirement that
37 80 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1996).
138 See id. at 1169.
139 Id. at 1154-55.
140 Id. at 1169-70.
141 See id. at 1168-69 & 1169 n.14.
142 Id. at 1169-70 (emphasis added).
143 Id. The court cited Carey v. Duckworth, 738 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1984), as support
for this proposition, see Morris, 80 F.3d at 1169, a case oft cited for its dictum that a prosecu-
tor cannot evade his Brady obligations by keeping himself in ignorance or "compartmental-
izing information about different aspects of a case." Carey, 738 F.2d at 878. In dictum, the
Carey court stated that it did "not need to decide whether DEA, the police, and the state
prosecutor can all be charged with constructive knowledge of each other's arrangements,"
but nonetheless stated that 'joint state-federal drug investigations are quite common" and
that prosecutors, therefore, "should not simply assume that they have no responsibility for
keeping abreast of decisions made by other members of the team." Id. at 878.
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the outside government entity be a law enforcement entity. In United
States v. Wood, in which the defendants were charged and convicted of
conspiring to defraud the FDA, 144 Circuit Judge Noonan found that
the government had suppressed evidence by failing to disclose certain
FDA documents of which the prosecution was aware but which only
the FDA possessed, stating that "[f]or Brady purposes, the FDA and
the prosecutor were one."'145 Applying and perhaps expanding the
prosecution team standard, the court held that "under Brady the
agency charged with administration of the statute, which has con-
sulted with the prosecutor in the steps leading to prosecution, is to be
considered as part of the prosecution in determining what informa-
tion must be made available to the defendant charged with violation
of the statute."'146 The decision did not discuss the prosecution team
standard so much as it appealed to notions of basic fairness and the
fact that the FDA had an institutional interest in prosecuting the de-
fendants: "The government in the form of the prosecutor cannot tell
the court that there is nothing more to disclose while the agency inter-
ested in the prosecution holds in its files information favorable to the
defendant." 47 Similarly, in United States v. Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, the
Ninth Circuit declined to reverse a district court's refusal to compel
the prosecution to discover and disclose Brady material beyond what
was contained in its files, stating that "[w]hile the prosecution must
disclose any information within the possession or control of law en-
forcement personnel, it has no duty to volunteer information that it
does not possess or of which it is unaware."'148
The Second Circuit decisions applying the prosecution team stan-
dard emphasize the limits on the scope of a prosecutor's duty to
search for Brady material. In United States v. Payne, for example, the
144 57 F.3d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1995).
145 Id. at 737.
146 Id.
147 Id. The FDA materials at the center of the controversy were requested under Rule
16. See id. at 736. The fact that the court looked to Brady to find the scope of the prosecu-
tor's duty to disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence in response to the defendant's
motion supports the conclusion that any parameters set on the scope of a prosecutor's
duty to seek Brady material in the possession of other arms of the government will apply
equally in the statutory discovery context. See supra note 35.
148 754 F.2d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). The case that the Ninth
Circuit cited for this proposition involved a prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence pos-
sessed by the prosecution's investigative arm-in that case, the police. See id. (citing Im-
bier v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 806 (C.D. Cal. 1969)). One may presume, then, that the
Hsieh Hui Mei Chen court meant only that the prosecution must disclose information within
the possession or control of law enforcement personnel involved in the investigation of the
charged conduct. Moreover, the court in the same opinion declined to reverse the trial
court's refusal to compel the prosecution to hand over an internal Border Patrol investiga-
tive report regarding the government official that the defendant allegedly bribed on the
basis of the immateriality of the evidence, not the government's lack of control or posses-
sion of the evidence. See id. at 824.
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Second Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court's Kyles decision, found
that a federal prosecutor had suppressed evidence when he failed to
disclose to the defendant impeachment evidence known to him but
filed with another trial court as part of a related action. 49 The Payne
court stated that "[t]he individual prosecutor is presumed to have
knowledge of all information gathered in connection with the govern-
ment's investigation."'' 51 In Payne, the government's key witness, as a
result of the same DEA investigation that gave rise to the charges
against the defendant, had been charged for her involvement in the
defendant's scheme before agreeing to cooperate with authorities.15 1
An affidavit the witness had submitted in her separate trial, before
agreeing to cooperate with the government, contained statements
that contradicted her trial testimony inculpating the defendant. 52
The Second Circuit followed Payne in United States v. Avellino. 153 The
Avellino court did not reach the issue of the scope of a prosecutor's
duty to search for Brady material but, relying on its prior decisions in
United States v. Quinn15 4 and United States v. Locascio5 5 as well as the
Eastern District of New York's decision in United States v. Gambino,156
nevertheless stated that
knowledge on the part of persons employed by a different office of
the government does not in all instances warrant the imputation of
knowledge to the prosecutor, for the imposition of an unlimited
duty on a prosecutor to inquire of other offices not working with
the prosecutor's office on the case in question would inappropri-
ately require us to adopt "a monolithic view of government" that
would "condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of
paralysis." 157
149 63 F.3d 1200, 1208 (2d Cir. 1995).
150 Id. The prosecution argued on appeal that because the material was in public
records, the defendant's failure to obtain the documents was due to lack of diligence on
the part of defense counsel. See id. Thus, the more specific ground for the court's holding
was that public availability does not obviate a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material
if defense counsel lacks notice that a particular branch of the government posseses such
material. See id. at 1209. Nevertheless, the court would not have reached the issue of
public availability if it had not first implicitly ruled that the material was in the govern-
ment's possession. Its reliance on Kyles suggests that the court construed the prosecution's
duty to search for Brady material to be limited to material in the possession of some arm of
the prosecution. Because the witness's and the defendant's separate prosecutions arose
out of the same criminal investigation, the court concluded that any documents relating to
any single prosecution were to be treated as part of the other prosecution as well. See id. at
1208-09.
151 See id. at 1203-05.
152 See id. at 1204-05.
153 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998).
154 445 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1971).
155 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993).
156 835 F. Supp. 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
157 136 F.3d at 255 (quoting Gambino, 835 F. Supp. at 95). In Gambino, the district
court refused to impute to the federal prosecutor knowledge of Brady material that a state
1498 [Vol. 88:1471
2003] PROSECUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 1499
The Second Circuit thus recognizes that the courts, in seeking to en-
sure that criminal convictions are accurate, must not impose too great
an administrative burden on a prosecutor's office when requiring the
prosecution to search other arms of the government.
The Tenth Circuit applies a version of the prosecution team stan-
dard that deviates from Antone in that it does not require the outside
government entity to have been directed by a prosecutor's office or to
have cooperated with a prosecutor's office in its investigation. In
Smith v. Secretary of New Mexico Department of Corrections, the Tenth Cir-
cuit found that a state prosecutor had suppressed evidence when he
failed to disclose impeachment material of which he was unaware but
which was held by state law enforcement-county police investiga-
tors-known to be conducting a separate investigation of the defen-
dant's alleged crime. 158 Relying on Giglio and the Fifth Circuit's
attorney and an FBI agent had gained in an unrelated criminal investigation four years
earlier, on the grounds that such a holding would impose too burdensome a search duty.
See 835 F. Supp. at 94-95. Other than the alleged Brady material's lack of relation to the
prosecution's investigation and the extent of the administrative burden imposed by a
broad duty to search, see id. at 95, Gambino did not suggest any other basis for limiting the
prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material.
The Avettino court relied also on Quinn in applying the prosecution team standard. See
136 F.3d at 255-56. In Quinn, the Second Circuit declined to find a Brady violation where
a federal prosecutor in New York failed to disclose to the defense a government witness's
criminal records not known to the prosecutor but known to and possessed by a (presuma-
bly federal) prosecutor in Florida. See 445 F.2d at 944. The court concluded that the
defendants had taken "the completely untenable position that 'knowledge of any part of
the government is equivalent to knowledge on the part of this prosecutor' and that 'he
[the New York prosecutor] must be deemed to have had constructive knowledge of this
evidence.'" Id. (quoting Appellants' Brief). In addition to the implicit jurisdictional limi-
tation imposed by the court, Quinn pointed also to the administrative burden as a basis for
limiting the prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material: "The Department of Justice
alone has thousands of employees in the fifty States of the Union. Add to these many more
thousands of employees of 'any part of the government.' [Defendants'] argument can be
disposed of on a 'reductio ad absurdum' basis." Id.
Finally, the Avettino court relied also on Locascio in applying the prosecution team
standard. See 136 F.3d at 255. In Locascio, the Second Circuit declined to find a Brady
violation where a federal prosecutor in New York failed to disclose impeachment evidence
that was not known to the prosecution but was held by the FBI. See 6 F.3d at 949-50. The
report had been prepared by agents who were not involved in the defendants' investigation
or prosecution. See id. at 948. The court applied the prosecution team standard: "Even
assuming the reports' materiality, there is no evidence that the prosecution team in the
instant case was aware of the reports that have subsequently come to light. We will not
infer the prosecutors' knowledge simply because some other government agents knew
about the report." Id. at 949.
158 50 F.3d 801, 824-25, 830-31 (10th Cir. 1995). The prosecutor apparently relied
solely on investigative work done by authorities in Bernalillo County, New Mexico, but he
apparently knew that authorities in Torrance County were conducting a separate investiga-
tion into the same crime. See id. at 825 n.36. "Clearly," the court observed, "if the prosecu-
tion had actual knowledge that several arms of the State were involved in the investigation
of a particular case, then the knowledge of those arms is imputed to the prosecution." Id.
The court recognized, however, that there is no settled approach regarding imputation in
cases in which the prosecution is unaware of the separate investigation. See id.
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decision in Martinez v. Wainwright,159 CircuitJudge Brorby stated that
"the 'prosecution' for Brady purposes encompasses not only the indi-
vidual prosecutor handling the case, but also extends to the prosecu-
tor's entire office, as well as law enforcement personnel and other
arms of the state involved in investigative aspects of a particular crimi-
nal venture." 60 In a statement that contemplates an even broader
prosecutorial duty to search for Brady material, the Tenth Circuit in
United States v. Beers,'61 relying on both its prior prosecution team deci-
sion in Smith and the Ninth Circuit's same-sovereign availability/acces-
sibility decision in United States v. Aichele,162 asserted that
"[i]nformation possessed by other branches of the federal govern-
ment, including investigating officers, is typically imputed to the pros-
ecutors of the case."' 163 However, Circuit Judge Tacha "decline[d] to
extend this principle for federal prosecutors to exculpatory materials
in the possession of the state government," 164 holding that a New
Mexico federal prosecutor did not suppress evidence when he failed
to disclose impeachment material not known to him but possessed by
the state of New Mexico.' 65 Elsewhere in its opinion, the Beers court
implicitly limited the apparently broad scope of a prosecutor's duty to
search for Brady material by basing its holding on the fact that New
Mexico state officials were not a part of the prosecution team, observ-
ing that "there is no indication that the investigation was ajoint effort
between the state and federal government. ' 166 Commenting on the
administrative burden imposed by an any-sovereign approach to de-
termining a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material, the court
remarked that "[it is unrealistic to expect federal prosecutors to
know all information possessed by state officials affecting a federal
case, especially when the information results from an unrelated state
investigation." 67
The Eleventh Circuit, which was a part of the Fifth Circuit until
1981, adds a jurisdictional limitation to Antone's prosecution team
standard. In United States v. Meros, for example, the Eleventh Circuit
declined to find that a Florida federal prosecutor suppressed evidence
when he failed to turn over impeachment material not known to him
but possessed by Georgia and Pennsylvania federal prosecutors in-
159 621 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of Wainwright, see infra notes
197-200 and accompanying text.
160 Smith, 50 F.3d at 824 (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote and citation
omitted).
161 See 189 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
162 941 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1991).
163 Beers, 189 F.3d at 1304.
164 Id.
165 See id. at 1303-04.
166 Id. at 1303.
167 Id. at 1304.
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volved in separate investigations. 168 The trial court denied the defen-
dant's motion to compel the Florida federal prosecutor to disclose
information about a government witness's plea agreements with fed-
eral prosecutors in Pennsylvania and Georgia. The trial court held
that the material was not in the government's possession for Brady
purposes.1 69 Relying on the Fifth Circuit's prosecution team decision
in Antone and emphasizing a jurisdictional limitation on a prosecu-
tor's duty, the Eleventh Circuit refused to disturb the ruling, stating
that "Brady and its progeny apply to evidence possessed by a "'district's
prosecution" team, which includes both investigative and
prosecutorial personnel."' Brady, then, applies only to information
possessed by the prosecutor or anyone over whom he has authority.' 70
Similarly, in Moon v. Head, the Eleventh Circuit declined to find that a
Georgia state prosecutor had suppressed evidence when he failed to
disclose to the defense impeachment material not known to him but
possessed by Tennessee law enforcement officials, some of whom par-
ticipated in the Georgia prosecution. 171 Relying on the court's prior
Meros decision and the Fifth and. Second Circuits' prosecution team
decisions in Antone and Avellino, Circuit Judge Tjoflat stated that the
defendant was required to show that the Georgia state prosecutor had
authority over the Tennessee law enforcement officials, that the Geor-
gia prosecutor pooled his investigative energies with Tennessee law
enforcement to prosecute the defendant, and that Tennessee law en-
forcement worked with the Georgia prosecutor's office on the defen-
dant's case.' 72 The court found that none of these factors was
present, stating that "[a]s the Georgia Supreme Court held, we find
no evidence that Tennessee law enforcement officials and Georgia
prosecutors engaged in a joint investigation of the [defendant's
crime] .173
168 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 1989).
169 See id. at 1307-08.
170 Id. at 1309 (citation and footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Antone, 603
F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1979)). Because the court's decision stated that "[a] prosecutor has
no duty to undertake a fishing expedition in other jurisdictions in an effort to find poten-
tially impeaching evidence every time a criminal defendant makes a Brady request," id.,
Meros seemed to apply the same-jurisdiction limitation applied in the Second and Eighth
Circuits in United States v. Quinn and United States v. Hawkins to determine the scope of a
prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material not in his possession. See supra note 154 and
accompanying text; infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text. However, this jurisdic-
tional limitation was unnecessary to the court's application of the prosecution team
standard.
171 285 F.3d 1301, 1308-10 (11th Cir. 2002).
172 See id. at 1309-10.
173 Id. at 1310 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has applied
the prosecution team standard in a number of other cases. See, e.g., McMillian v. Johnson,
88 F.3d 1554, 1568-69 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that a prosecutor violated his Brady obliga-
tions by failing to disclose Brady material discovered by investigators during a separate but
related contemporaneous investigation); Stano v. Butterworth, 51 F.3d 942, 945-46 (11th
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The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals also applies a prosecution
team standard similar to that applied in Antone when evaluating the
scope of a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material, but requires
that the search duty be triggered by a likelihood of a successful search.
In United States v. Brooks, for example, CircuitJudge Williams ordered
a federal prosecutor to search state law enforcement files for Brady
material. 74 Relying on the fact that "cases finding a duty to search
have involved files maintained by branches of government 'closely al-
igned with the prosecution,"' the court held that because of the "close
working relationship between the Washington metropolitan police
and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia (who prosecutes
both federal and District crimes, in both the federal and Superior
courts), a relationship obviously at work in this prosecution," any
prosecutorial duty to search for Brady material extended to the police
department's records. 175 However, although the court found that the
prosecutor's duty theoretically extended to the files, it held that the
duty to search the files is triggered only if there is a sufficient likeli-
hood that the files contain Brady material. 176 Thus, if it should be
clear to a prosecutor that its investigative arm might possess Brady ma-
terial, or if defense counsel makes an explicit request pinpointing cer-
tain files that can be searched without difficulty and that have more
than a trivial probability of containing Brady material, the D.C. Circuit
will not find that a discovery request is too speculative to require a
search. 177
Cir. 1995) (upholding a trial court's alternative holding denying a Brady claim because the
alleged Brady material was held by a state law enforcement official not jointly involved in
the prosecution's investigation); Ross v. Hopper, 716 F.2d 1528, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1983)
(relying on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Freeman v. Georgia to hold that "[a]ny promises
offered.., by law enforcement officers, or any information obtained by them in the course
of their investigation, must be attributed to the prosecutor"). The Eleventh Circuit has
deviated from its prosecution team standard at least once and applied a standard reminis-
cent of the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits' same-sovereign limitation on the avail-
ability/accessibility standard. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text. In United
States v. Walker, for example, a federal prosecutor failed to disclose to the defense that the
government's chief witness, an informant, stood to gain financially from an arrangement
with state law enforcement officials. 720 F.2d 1527, 1535 (11th Cir. 1983). Although the
state law enforcement officials appeared to have been the federal prosecution's investiga-
tory arm (or at least to have jointly investigated the alleged crime with federal law enforce-
ment), Circuit Judge Vance declined to find that the prosecutor suppressed this
information because he did "not believe that knowledge of any deal between state officials
and [the government's chief witness] can be imputed to the federal prosecutor." Id. Thus,
Walker appeared to impose a same-sovereign limitation on the prosecution team standard.
174 966 F.2d 1500, 1502-05 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
175 Id. at 1503 (citation omitted).
176 See id.
177 See id. at 1504.
1502 [Vol. 88:1471
2003] PROSECUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 1503
B. The "Availability/Accessibility" Standard
Another approach commonly applied by the circuits to deter-
mine the scope of a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material not
within his actual possession or knowledge is the "availability/accessi-
bility" standard. As this subpart demonstrates, however, the circuits
that have applied the availability/accessibility standard, like the courts
applying the prosecution team standard, have not consistently re-
solved various issues that it raises, including whether the standard im-
poses a same-sovereign requirement, whether there is a good faith
search exception to the standard, and whether the standard imposes a
same-jurisdiction requirement.
The leading case is United States v. Perdomo, in which the defen-
dant was convicted in a federal district court in the Virgin Islands of
various felony drug offenses, primarily on the testimony of a paid gov-
ernment informant who testified about having purchased drugs from
the defendant. 78 Prior to trial, the defendant, Perdomo, submitted
written requests for any information relating to the criminal back-
ground of any prosecution witness. '7 9 After running a National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) computer check, the prosecution re-
sponded that its key witness, the paid informant, had no criminal re-
cord. 1") One day after Perdomo was convicted, it was discovered that
the paid informant indeed had a prior arrest and conviction record
that the prosecutor did not disclose because local Virgin Island arrests
and convictions were not recorded in the NCIC database.,' Without
discussing local law enforcement's apparent lack of participation in or
connection with the federal prosecutor's criminal investigation of
Perdomo, 18 2 the Third Circuit found that the federal prosecutor had
committed a Brady violation by failing to discover and disclose the gov-
ernment witness's local criminal record. 183 The court held that "the
prosecution is obligated to produce [Brady material] actually or con-
structively in its possession or accessible to it '' 84 and that "such informa-
178 929 F.2d 967, 968-69 (3d Cir. 1991).
179 Id. at 968.
180 Id. at 968-69.
181 Id. at 968-70.
182 The court failed to discuss the lack of an investigative relationship between the
prosecutor and local law enforcement, even though it appeared to rely on the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision in United States v. Antone. The court acknowledged, however, that Antone
applied the prosecution team theory to the issue of the scope of the prosecution's duty to
search for Brady material: "In considering a potential Brady violation and considering
whether the prosecution is responsible, the Fifth Circuit has refused 'to draw a distinction
between different agencies under the same government, focusing instead upon the "prose-
cution team" which includes both investigative and prosecutorial personnel.'" Id. at 970
(quoting United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 569 (1979)).
183 Id.
184 Id. (emphasis added).
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tion was available to [the prosecutor]. 185  Elaborating on the
meaning of the availability standard, the Perdomo court stated that "the
availability of information is not measured in terms of whether the
information is easy or difficult to obtain but by whether the informa-
tion is in the possession of some arm of the state."1 86 Thus, under
Perdomo, the scope of a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material
depends on the availability/accessibility of the material within some
arm of the state. 18
7
185 Id.
186 Id. at 971. As discussed in this subpart, the Ninth Circuit has implicitly construed
this standard to impose a same-sovereign limitation on the availability/accessibility stan-
dard. See infra notes 210-14 and accompanying text. Because Perdomo involved a federal
prosecutor who failed to discover and disclose a criminal record not possessed by some
arm of the federal government, see Perdomo, 929 F.2d at 968-69, the decision does not
appear to have imposed such a limitation.
187 The Third Circuit must have understood the "state" to include both the federal
and state governments within a jurisdiction, as the case involved a federal prosecutor's
failure to search local law enforcement for Brady material. See Perdomo, 929 F.2d at 970-71.
The Third Circuit has not uniformly applied Perdomo's availability/accessibility stan-
dard. For example, in United States v.Joselh, a prosecutor failed to turn over to the defense
impeachment evidence available on file in the prosecutor's office from an unrelated case.
See 996 F.2d 36, 37-38 (3d Cir. 1993). Although the case appeared to be controlled by
Perdono (because the file was readily available to the prosecution), the Third Circuit de-
clined to find a Brady violation. Id. at 41. After stating that it "construe[s] the term 'con-
structive possession' to mean that although a prosecutor has no actual knowledge, he
should nevertheless have known that the [Brady] material at issue was in existence," id. at
39, the Third Circuit recast its Perdomo decision as a holding based not on an availability/
accessibility standard but rather as one based on a constructive knowledge standard, see id.
The court stated that, in Perdomo, it was "unwilling to allow the prosecution to avoid its
Brady obligations by failing to take the minimal steps necessary to acquire the requested
information. Thus, [it] implicitly held that the prosecutor's actions were objectively unrea-
sonable in that the Perdomo prosecutor should have known of the requested information."
Id. at 40. Thus, the search standard applied in the Third Circuit may be a broader "the
prosecutor should have known of the Brady material" standard, rather than the already
broad availability/accessibility standard.
In addition to applying this broad constructive knowledge standard, the Third Circuit
has also applied a good faith exception to a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material.
In Hoilman v. Wilson, the Third Circuit declined to find a Brady violation where a prosecu-
tor failed to turn over impeachment evidence it possessed due to a clerical error because,
as the court stated, "where the government has diligently searched, no Brady violation will
be found." 158 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1998).
In addition to the good faith exception it has recognized, the Third Circuit has also
applied a "potential connection with the case" search standard that imposes no practical
limits on a prosecutor's duty to search the government for Brady material. In a 1993 case,
United States v. Thorton, a prosecutor failed to discover and disclose, in response to a Brady
request, information about DEA payments to two cooperating government witnesses. I
F.3d 149, 157 (3d Cir. 1993). The Third Circuit construed Perdomo as imposing on prose-
cutors "an obligation to make a thorough inquiry of all enforcement agencies that [have] a
potential connection with the witnesses." Id. at 158 (emphasis added). Thus, as articulated in
Thorton, Brady requires a prosecutor to search for exculpatory or impeachment materials
possessed by any branch of government that has a potential connection with the case.
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The Third Circuit's Perdomo decision relied on various Fifth Cir-
cuit decisions, including United States v. Deutsch,188 a Fifth Circuit deci-
sion preceding the Circuit's application of the prosecution team
standard in Antone. The defendants in Deutsch were convicted of offer-
ing to pay a U.S. Postal Service employee to extract credit cards from
the mail primarily on the testimony of another U.S. Postal Service em-
ployee, Morrison. 189 Prior to trial, the defendants sought to obtain
Morrison's personnel file.190 The prosecution refused, arguing that it
could not be compelled to disclose Brady material not in its possession
and that, because the U.S. Postal Service was not an arm of the prose-
cution, the material it held was not in the government's possession. 19 1
The Fifth Circuit rejected the government's argument and the lower
court's acceptance of it, stating that it found "no reference in Brady to
an arm of the prosecution. '" 192 However, without identifying the fac-
tors closely connecting the U.S. Postal Service and the federal prose-
cutor's office, the court hinted that it applied the prosecution team
standard when it stated that "there is no suggestion in Brady that dif-
ferent 'arms' of the government, particularly when so closely con-
nected as this one for the purpose of the case, are severable
entities."'193 Nevertheless, speaking implicitly to the scope of a prose-
cutor's duty to search for Brady material, the court remarked that
"[t] he government cannot compartmentalize the Department of Jus-
tice and permit it to bring a charge affecting a government employee
in the Post Office and use him as its principal witness, but deny having
access to the Post Office files.' 94 Deutsch thus contemplates that the
scope of a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material not known to
her but possessed by other branches of the government is limited only
by the availability/accessibility of the other branch's material to the
prosecutor. 195
188 475 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1973), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Henry, 749
F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984).
189 Id. at 56-57.
190 Id. at 57.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. The summary of the facts indicates that Morrison's superiors at the U.S. Postal
Service arranged for the law enforcement officers to arrest the defendants midway through
the transaction. See id. at 56.
194 Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
195 The Fifth Circuit subsequently applied Deutsch's broad availability/accessibility stan-
dard in United States v. Auten, 632 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1980). In that case, tried in the East-
ern District of Texas, the defendant appealed based on the government's failure to
disclose the full criminal record of its key witness, which was contained in documents from
Colorado and Texas. See id. at 480. The prosecutor argued that he had neither possession
nor knowledge of the material indicating the witness's criminal record, though his lack of
knowledge was due to the fact that he failed to run an FBI or National Crime Information
Center check. See id. at 481. Finding that the prosecutor had indeed suppressed evidence,
the court relied on a prior Fifth Circuit decision for the proposition that "'[t]he basic
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The Fifth Circuit applied its broad availability/accessibility stan-
dard again in Martinez v. Wainwright, a case in which the defendant
alleged that the prosecution violated its Brady obligations by failing to
produce, in response to a specific request, a homicide victim's rap
sheet.' 96 Although a copy of the rap sheet was available in the medi-
cal examiner's office and from the FBI throughout the prosecution, y97
the prosecutor denied knowledge of a rap sheet before, during, and
after the trial, assuring the court that he had made every effort possi-
ble to obtain one.198 In finding a Brady violation, the Fifth Circuit
rejected the prosecution's argument that it could not have suppressed
a document not known to it and not within its possession, observing
that "[t]he prosecutor never alleged any difficulty in gaining access to
the rap sheet held by the medical examiner's office" and that "[t]he
rule of Brady would be thwarted if a prosecutor were free to ignore
specific requests for material information obtainable by the prosecutor
from a related governmental entity."'199 The Fifth Circuit's decision
import of Brady is ... that there is an obligation on the part of the prosecution to produce
certain evidence actually or constructively in its possession or accessible to it."' Id. (second
alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 223
(5th Cir. 1975)). Emphasizing its holding's basis in the availability of the evidence, the
court remarked that "the prosecutor has ready access to a veritable storehouse of relevant
facts and.., this access must be shared." Id. The Fifth Circuit followed Auten in Williams v.
Whitley, in which the court held that the prosecution suppressed evidence when it withheld
a police report, even though the prosecutor had no knowledge or possession of the mate-
rial. 940 F.2d 132, 133 (1991). The court reasoned that "the prosecution is deemed to
have knowledge of information readily available to it." Id. The Fifth Circuit again applied
the availability/accessibility standard in Martinez v. Wainwright, 621 F.2d 184 (5th Cir.
1980). See infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
The Fifth Circuit has not consistently applied Deutsch's broad availability/accessibility
standard. As discussed supra, Fifth Circuit opinions subsequent to Deutsch have adopted
the narrower construction of the court's holding. See supra notes 123-31 and accompany-
ing text. In United States v. Trevino, for example, the Fifth Circuit declined to find that a
federal prosecutor violated his Brady obligations by failing to disclose a presentence report
containing information which could have been used to impeach the government's primary
witness. 556 F.2d 1265, 1270-72 (5th Cir. 1977). The court noted that "[n]othing in the
Brady opinion would encompass a report compiled in an earlier prosecution and held by
the convicting court-which may or may not be the court in which the discovery motion is
considered-through its probation service." Id. at 1271. Without discussing why the evi-
dence was unavailable to the prosecutor, the court stated that "Brady involved evidence
available to and suppressed by the prosecution; its language is directed entirely to the
proper role of the prosecutor in according the accused a fair trial." Id. at 1270. The court
observed that if the presentence report had been in the hands of the prosecutor and had
contained Brady material, then it might have been compelled to find a Brady violation. See
id. at 1271 n.7. Because Trevino did not cite Deutsch, which the Fifth Circuit had decided
only four years earlier, the decision's failure to find a Brady violation on the basis of the
material's availability to the prosecution implicitly indicated the Fifth Circuit's retreat from
the broad availability/accessibility standard (i.e., cases like Deutsch) to the narrower prose-
cution team standard (i.e., cases like Antone).
196 621 F.2d at 185-87.
197 Id. at 187.
198 Id. at 185-86.
199 Id. at 187 (emphases added).
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did not discuss the prosecution team standard or even cite its prior
Antone decision, and it appeared to rely on the availability of the Brady
material to the prosecutor rather than on its possession by an arm of
the prosecution. However, the court did rebuff the prosecution's at-
tempt to limit the scope of its duty to search for Brady material to law
enforcement agencies, observing that such an argument "fails to ex-
plain why the medical examiner's office is not a state investigative
agency such that information in its possession is attributable to the
state."20
Despite the Seventh Circuit's occasional application of the more
limited prosecution team standard, 20 1 it has also applied a form of the
availability/accessibility standard that recognizes a good faith search
exception to a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material. In
Crivens v. Roth, the Seventh Circuit found a Brady violation in a state
prosecutor's failure to discover and disclose a government witness's
criminal record not known to the prosecution but maintained by its
investigative arm-in this case, the local police-because "the state...
had the information at its disposal."20 2 Although the facts suggest that
the court could have applied the prosecution team standard,20 3 it ex-
pressly adopted the availability/accessibility standard applied in the
Third and Fifth Circuits' Perdomo and Wainwright decisions. The court
remarked that "[w] e agree with other circuits that have explained that
'the availability of information is not measured in terms of whether
the information is easy or difficult to obtain but by whether the infor-
mation is in the possession of some arm of the state.' "204 Similarly, in
United States v. Young, the Seventh Circuit refused to find a Brady viola-
tion in a federal prosecutor's failure to discover and disclose a govern-
ment witness's criminal record not known to him but maintained by
state officials in another state, because the prosecution had made a
good faith effort to discover Brady material not in its possession. 20 5
200 Id. at 187 n.4.
201 See supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
202 172 F.3d 991, 997 (7th Cir. 1999).
203 The facts of the case suggest that the Chicago Police Department alone worked
with the prosecution to provide all the investigative and trial assistance in the criminal
investigation. See id. at 993-94, 997.
204 Id. at 997-98 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967,
971 (3d Cir. 1991)). The court provided no discussion of a prosecution team standard,
even though it cited the Supreme Court's decision in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432
(1995), for the proposition that a prosecutor has an affirmative duty to disclose such evi-
dence and a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government's behalf in a case. See Crivens, 172 F.3d at 996.
205 20 F.3d 758, 764-65 (7th Cir. 1994). Robert Hochman has argued that cases like
Young stand for the proposition that some circuits apply a same-sovereign standard (dis-
tinct from other standards) to determine the scope of a prosecutor's duty to search for
Brady material. See Hochman, supra note 31, at 1680-81. In fact, Young, which relies on
Auten and Perdomo, and like cases are better treated as part of the same line of cases that
1507
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Circuit Judge Eschbach stated that "the prosecution's obligation in a
criminal proceeding to disclose information is limited to information
known to the prosecution. '" 20 6 Moreover, relying on the Third and
Fifth Circuits' Perdomo and Auten decisions, the court stated that it
could find prosecutorial suppression only if "the government inten-
tionally failed to seek out information readily available to it."207 Thus,
deviating from the Third and Fifth Circuit approaches, Young held
that the availability/accessibility standard is satisfied if a prosecutor
makes a good faith effort to discover Brady material. 208
In addition to the prosecution team standard it has occasionally
applied,2°1 9 the Ninth Circuit has also applied a form of the availabil-
ity/accessibility standard that imposes a same-sovereign limitation on
the scope of a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material not in her
possession or knowledge. For example, in United States v. Aichele, the
Ninth Circuit declined to find a Brady violation when a federal prose-
cutor failed to disclose impeachment material apparently known to
him, but held by a state department of correction, because the mate-
rial was not under the federal prosecutor's control. 210 Circuit Judge
Rymer stated that "the only impeachment material still sought was
[the government witness's] first California Department of Corrections
file, which was under the control of California officials. The prosecu-
tion is under no obligation to turn over materials not under its con-
trol."2 1I That Aichele was based on the same-sovereignty limitation and
not on the control standard is evidenced by the court's decision in
base the scope of a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material on the availability/acces-
sibility of the material within some arm of the government. As observed supra, the Ninth
Circuit has imposed a same-sovereign limitation on the accessibility/availability standard.
See infra notes 210-14 and accompanying text. Judging from Young's holding, the Seventh
Circuit does not appear to have adopted the same limitation.
206 Young, 20 F.3d at 764.
207 Id.
208 The court in Young observed that the case was "simply not analogous to Perdomo
and Auten" because "the government did not 'keep itself in ignorance"' about the witness's
criminal history, but rather "diligently searched the pertinent criminal records for informa-
tion on [the witness], asked [the witness] directly about his criminal history, and disclosed
all of its information to Young." Id. One could infer from this language that the decision
was actually based on the prosecution's good faith effort to discover Brady material not in
its possession. However, reading Young as creating a "good faith effort to discover" excep-
tion to the availability/accessibility standard applied in Perdomo and Auten appears to
render the case inconsistent with Brady's holding that the good or bad faith of a prosecutor
is irrelevant. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). On the other hand, the court's
acceptance of a good faith but unsuccessful effort to discover Brady material not in the
same sovereign's possession could be construed as consistent with Supreme Court prece-
dent, because the Supreme Court has never required the prosecution to turn over exculpa-
tory or impeachment material not in the same sovereign's possession.
209 See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
210 941 F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1991).
211 Id. Aichele relied on United States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 1985), for
this proposition. See Aichele, 941 F.3d at 764. In Gatto, the Ninth Circuit held that the
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United States v. Jennings, in which the Ninth Circuit upheld a district
court order compelling a federal prosecutor to review the files of testi-
fying federal law enforcement personnel, apparently for impeach-
ment evidence. 212 "[P]ersonal responsibility [for compliance with
Brady]," the court noted, "cannot be evaded by claiming lack of con-
trol over the files or procedures of other executive branch agen-
cies." 213  In support of its holding, the court cited Martinez v.
Wainwright, the Fifth Circuit decision applying the availability/accessi-
bility standard to the determination of the scope of a prosecutor's
duty to search for Brady material not in his possession or
knowledge. 2 14
The First Circuit has followed the Ninth Circuit's line of cases
imposing a same-sovereign requirement on the availability/accessibil-
ity standard. In United States v. Sepulveda, the First Circuit, relying on
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Aichele, held that a New Hampshire
federal prosecutor did not have a duty to search for Brady material not
known to him but possessed by New Hampshire state authorities.21 5
The court based its decision solely on the assertion that "the rigors of
Brady do not usually attach to material outside the federal govern-
ment's control." 216 Similarly, in United States v. Osorio, the First Circuit
found that a federal prosecutor violated his disclosure obligations be-
cause he failed to discover and disclose to the defense until midway
through the defendant's trial that the government's chief witness was
a major drug dealer; this information was unknown to the federal
prosecutor but apparently was generally known within the U.S. Attor-
ney's Office and the FBI.21 7 Implicitly imposing the same-sovereign
requirement on the access/accessibility standard, the court stated that
"'[t]he government' is not a congery of independent hermetically
sealed compartments; and the prosecutor in the courtroom, the
United States Attorney's Office in which he works, and the FBI are not
federal government need not produce materials controlled by state officials in response to
a Rule 16 motion. 763 F.2d at 1049.
212 960 F.2d 1488, 1490-92 (9th Cir. 1992).
213 Id. at 1490. The lower court did not require the federal prosecutor to review the
files of local and state law enforcement officers. Id. at 1489. The defendant apparently did
not appeal this decision, which indicates that the validity of the same-sovereign limitation
on the availability/accessibility standard was not in dispute in the Ninth Circuit at the time
the court decided Jennings.
214 See id. at 1490-91; see also supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text (discussing
Martinez).
215 15 F.3d 1161, 1179 (1st Cir. 1993).
216 Id. The alleged Brady material was a presentence report prepared for a New Hamp-
shire state court that listed a key witness's entire criminal history; this history was not fully
set out in FBI records furnished to the defendant during pretrial discovery. See id. at
1178-79. The court did not indicate whether New Hampshire law enforcement was in-
volved in the defendant's investigation.
217 929 F.2d 753, 756-57 (1st Cir. 1991).
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separate sovereignties. The prosecution of criminal activity is a joint
enterprise among all these aspects of 'the government." 218
The Eighth Circuit has gone a step further than the First and
Ninth Circuits by imposing a same-jurisdiction limitation in addition
to the same-sovereign limitation on the availability/accessibility stan-
dard.219 For example, in United States v. Hawkins, a post-Kyles decision,
the court declined to find that a Missouri federal prosecutor violated
his Brady obligations when he failed to discover and disclose Brady ma-
terial not known to him but possessed by a federal prosecutor in Illi-
nois. 220 The court based its decision on the grounds that "the
'prosecutor has no duty to undertake a fishing expedition in other
jurisdictions in an effort to find impeaching evidence.'"'2 2 1
C. The "Actual Knowledge and Possession" Standard
The Seventh Circuit has, in a pair of pre-Kyles opinions, held that
the prosecution has no duty to search for Brady material not known to
or possessed by it. In United States v. Romo, the defendant alleged that
the prosecution violated its duty under Brady to search for exculpatory
or impeachment material because the prosecutor refused to respond
to the defendant's requests that he make "various inquiries" of the
local police force involved in the investigation that led to the defen-
218 Id. at 760. It is important to note that the First Circuit was not articulating the
prosecution team standard in this passage. As emphasized above, the court stated that "[i]t
is apparent that [the chief witness's] past was well known to others in 'the government,'
including both the United States Attorney's Office and the FBI, which was using him as a
cooperating individual." Id. The court also stated that "[i]t is wholly unacceptable that the
Assistant United States Attorney trying the case was not prompted personally or institution-
ally to seek from knowledgeable colleagues highly material impeachment information con-
cerning the government's most significant witness." Id. at 761. These passages imply that a
federal prosecutor has a duty to search for Brady material known to or held by individuals
within his own office or by individuals within the FBI regardless of their involvement in the
immediate criminal prosecution. Although the case does not explicitly do so, the Osorio
court's formulation of the scope of a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material appears
to limit that duty to members of law enforcement traditionally involved in criminal
investigations.
219 The Eighth Circuit implicitly applied the same-sovereign limitation to the availabil-
ity/accessibility standard in United States v. Dunn, 851 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1988). In Dunn,
the court declined to find that a South Dakota federal prosecutor violated his Brady obliga-
tions by failing to discover and disclose Brady material gathered by a South Dakota child
protection worker: "The district court found that [the state child protection worker] was
not a government employee, and ... [b]ecause [her] report was not in the government's
possession, the Brady doctrine is inapplicable in this case." Id. at 1101.
220 78 F.3d 348, 351 (8th Cir. 1996). The defendant also had charges pending against
him in the Southern District of Illinois. See id. The court did not indicate if the Illinois
charges arose from the same criminal investigation giving rise to the Missouri charges or if
the Brady material in Illinois came from a source that participated in the investigation
leading to the Missouri charges.
221 Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 1994)).
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dant's indictment. 222 In finding that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by refusing to compel the prosecution to comply with
the defendant's request, Circuit Judge Manion stated that "prosecu-
tors are not usually required to seek out [Brady material] which is not
in their possession. '223 The court held that the prosecution is not re-
quired to search for Brady material in response to a defendant's dis-
covery request unless either the request gives an indication that there
is exculpatory material to be discovered or the defendant makes a
showing that the government has suppressed Brady material. 224 Simi-
larly, in United States v. Moore, the Seventh Circuit refused to find that
the prosecution violated its Brady obligations by failing to disclose that
one of its witnesses had previously been convicted of knowingly sup-
plying false information to a police officer.22 5 Relying, as the Romo
court had, on Mendoza v. Miller, CircuitJudge Wood stated that "[t]he
rule in Brady simply does not apply unless the prosecutor had knowl-
edge of the exculpatory information. ' 2 26 Then, quoting the Romo
court's erroneous reading of Mendoza,227 the Moore court went on to
state that "'prosecutors are not usually required to seek out informa-
tion which is not in their possession.' "228 The Seventh Circuit thus
created a line of cases, without any support, that stand for the unquali-
222 914 F.2d 889, 898 (7th Cir. 1990).
223 Id. Were it not qualified, this assertion would be a misstatement of the law on its
face, even before Kyles. Nonetheless, this assertion is at least a misstatement of the rule
announced in Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1985), the case the Romo court
cited in support of this assertion. In Mendoza, which involved a habeas corpus petition, a
prisoner challenged a prison disciplinary board's failure to turn over FBI reports relating
to his alleged offense. See Mendoza, 779 F.2d at 1296-97. Because the adjudication was civil
in nature, Brady presumably did not apply. See id. at 1297. Nevertheless, in dictum, Circuit
Judge Coffey applied the prosecution team standard to rule that the disciplinary board was
not obligated to turn over the FBI report:
The prison staff conducts an investigation of prison incidents separate from
any FBI investigation. Thus, the FBI is not a part of the disciplinary prose-
cution, they have no obligation to turn over their files to the disciplinary
committee, and their alleged failure to disclose material cannot be attrib-
uted to the disciplinary committee.
Id. (citations omitted). Thus, even if this dictum were a binding statement of the law, it
would not support the general proposition stated by the Seventh Circuit in Romo that
"prosecutors are not usually required to seek out [Brady material] which is not in their
possession." Romo, 914 F.2d at 898.
224 See Romo, 914 F.2d at 898-99. Circuit Judge Manion pointed to two other factors.
First, he noted that the prosecution made available all material that was actually in its
possession, "which negates most arguments that the prosecutors suppressed exculpatory
information." Id. at 899. Second, he observed that the defense failed to subpoena the
local police agency, and that this "strategic decision or mere failure ... should not place
the burden on the federal prosecutors to seek out such information on behalf of a defen-
dant." Id.
225 25 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 1994).
226 Id.
227 See supra note 223.
228 Moore, 25 F.3d at 569 (quoting Romo, 914 F.2d at 898).
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fled proposition that the prosecution has no obligation to search for
Brady material.229
III
MUST PROSECUTORS SEARCH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR
BRADY MATERAL IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST PROSECUTIONS UNDER
THE CIRCUIT APPROACHES?
As the overview of circuit case law in Part II indicates, the circuit
courts have applied varying standards to determine the scope of a
prosecutor's duty to search the government for Brady material. To
understand why these approaches could be construed to require a
trial court to impose on a federal prosecutor in an international ter-
rorist prosecution a duty to search for Brady material in the hands of
the intelligence community, one must first understand the nature of
the federal government's interagency investigation of international
terrorism.
A. The FBI's Inability to Conduct Independent Investigations of
International Terrorism
Countless terrorists and terrorist organizations throughout the
world 2 1 perpetrate hundreds of international terrorist attacks each
year.2 3 1 Although the reasons for terrorist attacks vary widely,23 2 the
U.S. government believes that anti-U.S. sentiment motivated at least
219 of the 348 terrorist attacks that occurred in 2001 (4 of which oc-
curred in North America).233 More disturbing than the frequency of
terrorist attacks is their increased lethality,234 a reality due in part not
229 See, e.g., United States v. Earnest, 129 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[T]here is no
affirmative duty on the part of the government to seek information not in its possession
when it is unaware of the existence of that information."); United States v. Jimenez-Rodri-
guez, Nos. 94-1968, 94-2072, 1995 WL 709639 (1st Cir. Dec. 1, 1995) ("[T]he rule of Brady
v. Maryland imposes no general due diligence requirement." (relying on Moore, 25 F.3d at
569)).
230 As of August 2002, the U.S. Department of State has designated thirty-four groups
as foreign terrorist organizations. See U.S. Dep't of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations
(Aug. 9, 2002), http://astron.berkeley.edu/-jhall/export/US_DeptState_FrO_site.pdf.
231 See supra note 1.
232 Although Americans may be most familiar with religiously motivated international
terrorism, terrorism may be motivated by many other reasons, including economic frustra-
tion, deprivation of rights, and ethnic and racial divisions. See Stephen Sloan, The Changing
Nature of Terrorism, in THE TERRORISM THREAT AND U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: OPERA-
TIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS 51, 56 (James M. Smith & William C. Thomas eds.,
2001).
233 See PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 1, app. I, at 171, 176. As indicated
in the Introduction of this Note, the United States is the world's leading target of interna-
tional terrorism, and government officials expect the use of terrorism against the United
States and its interests to continue both domestically and abroad. See supra note 1.
234 See PILLAR, supra note 1, at 20-21; David Tucker, Combating International Terrorism, in
THE TERRORISM THREAT AND U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 232, at 129, 131. One
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only to the fact that terrorists increasingly are attacking civilians or
other less-defended or undefended targets, 235 but also to the growing
lethality of the weapons available to them. 23 6 International terrorists
with access to biological weapons, for example-which more than ten
countries reportedly have or are developing 237-are capable of in-
flicting billions of dollars in losses and of taking hundreds of
thousands of lives in a single attack.238
The clandestine and networked nature of modern international
terrorist organizations requires the government to expend substantial
resources on detection efforts.239 Because terrorist operations must
analyst has constructed a lethality index for all terrorist attacks occurring between 1969
and 1998 that indicates a 20% increase in the lethality of terrorist attacks during this pe-
riod. See Tucker, supra, at 135-36. Recent events appear to support the conclusion that
terrorism is becoming a more deadly crime. Between 1995 and 2001, four attacks-the
Aum Shinrikyo's sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subways, the Tamil Tiger truck bombing of
the Central Bank in Colombo, the truck bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, and the
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon-accounted for over 14,000 injuries and
deaths. See PATrERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 1, app. I, at 173; Tucker, supra, at
136.
235 Policy makers expect that future terrorist attacks will be directed mainly at civilians
or other less-defended or undefended targets. See Current and Projected National Security
Threats to the United States: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 105th Cong. 60
(1997) (responses of the Defense Intelligence Agency to questions regarding global threats
and challenges to the Unites States and its interests abroad).
236 George Tenet, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, remarked in a prepared
statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that "[a]lthough terrorists we've
preempted still appear to be relying on conventional weapons, we know that a number of
these groups are seeking chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear... agents." Current
and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 106th Cong. 12 (2000) (statement of George J. Tenet, Director of Central
Intelligence).
237 See U.S. Dep't of Defense, Information Paper: Department of Defense Biological Warfare
Threat Analysis, http://www.defenselink.mil/otherinfo/threat.html (last updatedJune 10,
1998). Iraq and the former Soviet Union are known to have biological weapons programs.
See Lester C. Caudle III, The Biological Warfare Threat, in MEDICAL ASPECTS OF CHEMIAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 451, 456 (Frederick R. Sidell et al. eds., 1997). The government
believes that China, Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria, and Taiwan probably have such pro-
grams, and it is possible that Cuba, Israel, and Egypt do as well. Id.
238 One report has indicated that
if a biological agent such as anthrax were used on an urban population of
approximately 5 million people in an economically developed country such
as the United States, an attack on a large city from a single plane dissemi-
nating 50 kg of the dried agent in a suitable aerosol form would affect an
area far in excess of 20 km downwind, with approximately 100,000 deaths
and 250,000 being incapacitated or dying.
Caudle, supra note 237, at 456. Such a large-scale bioterrorist attack could have economic
consequences ranging from $477.7 million per 100,000 persons exposed up to $26.2 bil-
lion per 100,000 persons exposed, depending on the biological agent used. Arnold F.
Kaufmann et al., The Economic Impact of a Bioterrorist Attack: Are Prevention and Postattack
Intervention Programs Justifiable?, 3 EMERGING INFECTIOuS DISEASES 83, 91 (1997).
239 Between 1996 and 2001, the U.S. government spent more than $50 billion to detect
and prevent terrorism. See Robert Dreyfuss, Dim Intelligence: What Did We Get for All That
Money?, AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 22, 2001, at 10. In 2000, "the United States spent more than
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be covert to succeed, terrorist organizations have sought, with some
success, to avoid detection 4.2 41 Therefore, information about the ac-
tual operations of international terrorist networks is sparse. This real-
ity, of course, makes it difficult to create a model of terrorist activity2 4 1
$1.3 billion seeking to prevent and prepare for terrorist use of nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapons." Id.
240 See DAVID E. LONG, THE ANATOMY OF TERRORISM 7 (1990).
241 Although the world will continue to witness the emergence of hierarchical, state-
sponsored terrorist organizations, experts predict that modern terrorist networks are likely
to operate in chain, hub (centrifugal), or all-channel (full-matrix) networks. SeeJohn Ar-
quilla & David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Revisited), in NETWORKS AND NETWARS: THE
FUTURE OF TERROR, CRIME, AND MILITANCY 1, 6-10 Uohn Arquilla & David Ronfeldt eds.,
2001);J.K. Zawodny, Infrastructures of Terrorist Organizations, in PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM
61, 61-63 (Lawrence Zelic Freedman & Yonah Alexander eds., 1983). Active Middle East-
ern terrorist groups Hizbollah, al-Qaeda, and Hamas employ the network model. Michele
Zanini & Sean J.A. Edwards, The Networking of Terror in the Information Age, in NETWORKS AND
NETWARS, supra, at 29, 32-33. Under the network model, satellite cells need not have spe-
cific organizational ties to any larger organization, nor are they necessarily dependent on
some level of support from any larger organization. See Sloan, supra note 232, at 63.
A significant implication of the network model that makes international terror net-
works difficult investigative targets is the network's tendency to inspire intensely personal-
ized loyalties. This reality is due in part to the fact that movement leaders act as direct
participants in actions, see Zawodny, supra, at 63, and also to the indoctrination and intimi-
dation that terrorists experience both before and after they join a terrorist group. Leaders
of underground movements strive to maintain a collective belief system that urges the
moral necessity of apolitical resistance. See Martha Crenshaw, Decisions to Use Terrorism: Psy-
chological Constraints on Instrumental Reasoning, in 4 INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT RE-
SEARCH: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND VIOLENCE: PARTICIPATION IN UNDERGROUND
ORGANIZATIONS 29, 30-36 (Donatella della Porta ed., 1992). They characterize their oppo-
sition as external forces foreign to their own ethnic, regional, or religious group, with
which members identify deeply. See Donatella della Porta, On Individual Motivations in Un-
derground Political Organizations, in 4 INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH, supra, at
3, 12. Religious fundamentalists who propagate these radical religious belief systems may
draw support from religious texts. For example, because some Muslims believe that the
Koran enjoins the faithful from engaging in espionage, a radical Muslim terrorist organiza-
tion might draw from the following text from the Koran to encourage operational secrecy:
0 believers! Above all hold yourself from suspicion, for even a little suspi-
cion is criminal. Do not spy on one another, or cut down another, for
would anyone from among you desire to eat the flesh of his departed
brother? Of course, you would feel horror at this. Fear God: God the Re-
deemer, the Merciful.
See Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Espionage and the Ecclesia, 42J. CHURCH & ST. 803, 816 (2000). Once
members join terrorist organizations, they are dissuaded from violating their loyalty to the
group by a group dynamic of isolation, fear, and guilt. See Crenshaw, supra, at 30-36 (dis-
cussing the role of group dynamics and the creation and maintenance of a group belief
system in solidifying group loyalty); della Porta, supra, at 6-25 (discussing the central role
of adolescent peer group construction and political context in determining personal moti-
vations tojoin terrorist organizations). For example, in the 1970s, the Abu Nidal Organiza-
tion, a group still listed as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department, see
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 1, app. B, at 85, tested each new recruit by
making him commit an outrageous act, like a bank robbery or murder-something that
the organization could use later to keep the individual in check. See DUANE R. CLARRIDGE,
A SPy FOR ALL SEASONS: Mv LIFE IN THE CIA 332 (1997). The group loyalty created by these
practices makes it extremely unlikely that any cell members will agree to spy on their ter-
rorist network for the U.S. government. A former CIA operative notes that "[u]nless one
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that would permit the government to investigate and interdict terror-
ist conspiracies. 242
The FBI is the branch of the federal government primarily
responsible for investigating acts of international terrorism on
behalf of federal prosecutors. 243  It does so primarily to collect
evidence to bring suspected terrorists to trial,2 44 but also for the
of bin Ladin's foot soldiers walks through the door of a U.S. consulate or embassy, the
odds that a CIA counterterrorist officer will ever see one are extremely poor." Reuel Marc
Gerecht, The Counterterrorist Myth, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July-Aug. 2001, at 38, 41. A former
CIA case officer told a Newsweek reporter that "' [y]ou don't get walk-ins from terror cells."'
Evan Thomas, Handbook for the New War, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 8, 2001, at 34, 35. As counter-
intelligence expert Randy Scheunemann observes, "'How does the CIA propose to pene-
trate cells made up of individuals who forged their ties over decades in the dust of Palestin-
ian refugee camps, the chaos of Beirut or the killing fields of Afghanistan?"' Andrew
Roberts, Bring Back 007, SPECTATOR, Oct. 6, 2001, at 20, 21.
242 One analyst identifies two realities that make forecasting the nature of terrorist
threats and operations difficult: (1) terrorism is the result of evolving social, economic, or
political forces that change over time, which makes it difficult to identify the next source of
terrorism; and (2) terrorism is greatly impacted by technology, but changes in technology
are difficult to predict. See Sloan, supra note 232, at 52. Peter Probst observes that the
government's failure to deter terrorism can be traced in part to its failure to develop a
model of terrorist behavior:
In my view, the greatest threat to our security remains problems of mindset
and perception. We fail to appreciate how phenomena such as mindset
and perception impact on terrorist thinking and operations....
We need to understand on a group-specific basis how the terrorists
think, how they plan, how they collect intelligence, select targets, weigh
options, and adapt to operational adversity.
• . . [If we develop such an understanding], when there is no hard
intelligence as to the venue or timing of the next attack, we can more intel-
ligently game out the terrorists [sic] available options and how the terrorist
will most likely play his hand.
Peter S. Probst, Intelligence and Force Protection vs Terrorism, in THE TERRORISM THREAT AND
U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, supra note 232, at 169, 174.
243 The authority for the FBI's investigative efforts derives from federal law providing
that the Attorney General may appoint officials "to detect and prosecute crimes against the
United States" and "to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under
the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed
by the Attorney General." 28 U.S.C. § 533 (2000). The Attorney General has delegated
this authority to the FBI: federal regulations describe the FBI as having lead agency "re-
sponsibility in investigating all crimes ... which involve terrorist activities or acts in prepa-
ration of terrorist activities . . . . Within the United States, this' would include the
collection, coordination, analysis, management and dissemination of intelligence and
criminal information as appropriate." 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(1) (2002).
244 See 18 U.S.C. § 3107 (2000) (empowering the FBI to execute seizures under war-
rant for violation of U.S. laws); id. § 3052 (authorizing FBI officials to serve warrants and
subpoenas and to make arrests without a warrant for any offense against the United States
committed in their presence or for any felony if they have reasonable grounds to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony); Arthur S.
Hulnick, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: The "Spies Are Not Cops" Problem, 10 INT'LJ. INTELLI-
GENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 269, 276-77 (1997) (stating that the FBI uses its informers
and collaborators to collect information to be used by prosecutors at trial).
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purpose of disrupting, weakening, and eliminating terrorist net-
works.245
Although law enforcement efforts to investigate, apprehend, and
prosecute international terrorists are increasing,246 the difficulty of in-
vestigating secretive international terror networks that operate mostly
overseas dramatically impedes those efforts. The FBI conducts inter-
national terrorism investigations in accordance with the Attorney Gen-
eral Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign
Counterintelligence Investigations, a classified document.2 47 Under these
guidelines, the FBI may conduct investigations, participate with for-
eign officials in investigations abroad, or otherwise conduct activities
outside the United States only with the approval of the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Attorney General. 248 Despite the FBI's
growing international presence 249 and authority under U.S. law to in-
vestigate terrorist conspiracies abroad, 2-1 the FBI's investigative efforts
are hampered by the fact that international law prohibits law enforce-
245 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2001 PERFORMANCE REPORT & FY 2002 REVISED FINAL
PERFORMANCE PLAN, FY 2003 PERFORMANCE PLAN 1, 14-18, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annu-
alreports/pr2001/pdf/2001PerformanceReport.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2003). Immedi-
ately after the September 11, 2001 attacks, President George W. Bush called upon the law
enforcement community to increase efforts to apprehend terrorists before they act and to
shift focus from gathering evidence for use against suspected terrorists after such attacks
have occurred to deterring and preventing future acts of terrorism. See Bob Woodward &
Dan Balz, Combating Terrorism: 'It Starts Today', WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2002, at A]. At a Sep-
tember 17, 2001 cabinet meeting, President Bush informed his war cabinet that future
counterterrorism efforts would stress "preemption of future attacks" instead of the "tradi-
tional emphasis on investigations, gathering of evidence and prosecution." See id. A few
days earlier, Attorney General John Ashcroft told the President that the chief mission of
U.S. law enforcement would be to stop another terrorist attack, and that the focus of the
FBI and Justice Department should change from criminal prosecution to crime preven-
tion. See Bob Woodward & Dan Balz, 'We Will Rally the World', WASH. PosT, Jan. 28, 2002, at
Al. In a November 8, 2001 memorandum, Ashcroft stated that law enforcement "must
shift its primary focus from investigating and prosecuting past crimes to identifying threats
of future terrorist attacks, preventing them from happening and punishing would-be per-
petrators for their plans of terror." See Eric Lichtblau & Josh Meyer, Justice Dept. to Tighten
Focus on Terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at Al.
246 See supra note 3.
247 Some parts of the document, however, have been released. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND FOR-
EIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS (1995), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/reading
room/terrorismintel2.pdf.
248 Id. at 21. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual provides that "[o]verseas terrorist situations
will undoubtedly entail coordination with one or more foreign governments and such co-
ordination is best accomplished by and through the Department [of Justice] in consulta-
tion with the Department of State." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-
2.136 (2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareadingroom/usam/title9/
2mcrm.htm#9-2.136.
249 As of late 2000, the FBI had agents stationed in forty-four foreign countries-twice
as many as only seven years earlier. See PILLAR, supra note 1, at 80.
250 See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(e)-(f) (2000) (extending extraterritorial federal jurisdiction
over international terrorist conspiracies and granting the Attorney General primary investi-
gative responsibility for all federal crimes of terrorism).
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ment officers of the United States from exercising their functions
abroad without the permission of the host state.2 5 1 In addition, some
foreign laws forbid host governments from entering into agreements
to permit such activities. 252 Therefore, the FBI's overseas agents,
known as legal attaches, typically do not investigate criminal matters
personally, but instead work with local law enforcement agencies in
countries that have agreed to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement
efforts.253 Attaches have the authority to prepare evidence-gathering
requests, assist in the negotiation of treaties, transmit information to
other countries on new legislation and important cases, and organize
training.254
Because of these restraints, the FBI cannot fulfill its investigative
function in relation to clandestine international terrorist conspiracies
without the cooperation of foreign countries. 255 Although some ter-
rorists operate in countries that assist the United States in investigat-
ing and apprehending terrorist organizations, 25 6 international
251 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 432 & cmt. b, 433 (1987). The U.S. Attorneys' Manual provides, in relevant part:
Most problems associated with international evidence gathering revolve
around the concept of sovereignty. Virtually every nation vests responsibil-
ity for enforcing criminal laws in the sovereign. The other nation may re-
gard an effort by an American investigator or prosecutor to investigate a
crime or gather evidence within its borders as a violation of sovereignty.
Even such seemingly innocuous acts as a telephone call, a letter, or an un-
authorized visit to a witness overseas may fall within this stricture. A viola-
tion of sovereignty can generate diplomatic protests and result in denial of
access to the evidence or even the arrest of the agent or Assistant United
States Attorney who acts overseas.
The solution is usually to invoke the aid of the foreign sovereign in
obtaining the evidence.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 267 (1997), http://www.usdoj.gov/
usao/eousa/foiareading-room/usam/title9/crm00267.htm.
252 For example, the Iranian Constitution provides that "[a]ny form of agreement re-
sulting in foreign control over the natural resources, economy, army, or culture of the
country, as well as other aspects of the national life, is forbidden." IRAN CONST. ch. X, art.
153, available at http://www.netiran.com/laws.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
253 See ETHAN A. NADELMANN, Cops ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 152 (1993); Bruce Zagaris, US. International Cooperation
Against Transnational Organized Crime, 44 WAYNE L. REv. 1401, 1414-17 (1998).
254 Zagaris, supra note 253, at 1419.
255 Cf David A. Vise, New Global Role Puts FBI in Unsavory Company, WASH. POST, Oct. 29,
2000, at Al ("FBI officials say they need relationships with the Saudis, Yemenis and others
in the Middle East to fight terrorism effectively .... [T]he FBI depends upon 'friendly
foreign governments,' not only to arrest and extradite fugitives but also to permit the bu-
reau to operate on their soil."). In 1995, the FBI helped create the International Law
Enforcement Academy to assist foreign law enforcement agencies train their officers. See
GREGORY F. TREVERTON, RESHAPING NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN AN AGE OF INFORMATION 170
(2001).
256 For example, after the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, local authorities
helped the FBI conduct interviews and searches and permitted the FBI to remove evidence
and suspects to the United States. See David Johnston, A Painstaking Search for Answers, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1998, at AS. Since September 11, 2001 at least forty countries have made
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terrorists operate predominantly in countries governed by regimes ei-
ther unable 257 or unwilling to assist the FBI in investigating and appre-
hending suspected terrorists. 258 Currently, only a small group of
countries have signed mutual legal assistance treaties with the United
States.259 These realities render the FBI unable to investigate interna-
tional terrorism effectively without the assistance of the intelligence
community.
B. The Intelligence Community's Role in Investigating
International Terrorism
Many arms of the federal government participate in the investiga-
tion of international terrorism. The Office of Homeland Security is
responsible for coordinating executive branch efforts to detect, pre-
vent, and respond to terrorist threats and attacks within the United
States, and for coordinating the collection of intelligence outside the
terrorism-related arrests. SeeJames Risen & Tim Weiner, CIA Is Said to Have Sought Syrian
Help on Terror Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001, at B3. Singapore, for example, recently ar-
rested fifteen persons suspected of having ties to the al-Qaeda network who were planning
to bomb the local U.S. Embassy. See Craig Francis, Singapore "Terror Network" Broken, CNN,
Jan. 7, 2002, http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/01/07/singa-
pore.arrests/index.html.
257 U.S. law enforcement agents operating abroad may find that investigative tech-
niques used in the United States are not permitted in foreign countries. For example,
several drug enforcement techniques regarded as essential in the United States-such as
undercover operations, electronic surveillance, telephone taps, and informant recruitment
methods-are forbidden or severely circumscribed elsewhere. See NADELMANN, supra note
253, at 200.
258 For example, the Yemeni government did not permit a full FBI investigation after
the U.S.S. Cole was attacked near Yemen. See Peter Slevin & Alan Sipress, Tests Ahead for
Cooperation on Terrorism, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2001, at A10. Relations eventually deterio-
rated to the point that FBI agents left the country temporarily. Id. Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria are listed by the State Department as state sponsors of
terrorism, see PATFrERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 1, at 63-68, and cannot be ex-
pected to cooperate with FBI efforts to interdict terrorist conspiracies. However, even na-
tions allied with the United States sometimes are reluctant to cooperate with an FBI
investigation. See, e.g., John Crewdson, Belgian Authorities Reluctant to Help with Probe of Bomb
Plot, CiL. TRIB., Oct. 14, 2001, at 15. A nation may simply not want the public to know that
it is cooperating with the United States to apprehend terrorists within its territory, or it may
be unwilling to help the United States build a case because of its opposition to the death
penalty, which is available for some terrorist crimes. See PILLAR, supra note 1, at 84-85.
259 The State Department reports that mutual legal assistance treaties are currently in
force with the following countries: Anguilla, Antigua/Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Aus-
tria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Canada, Cayman Islands,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, Greece, Grenada, Hong Kong, Hun-
gary, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Montserrat, Morocco, Netherlands, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Romania, St. Kitts-Nevis,
St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad, Turkey, Turks and Caicos
Islands, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Uruguay. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE CIRCULAR ON MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS TREATIES, http://
travel.state.gov/mlat.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
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United States regarding these threats of terrorism. 260 The Office of
Homeland Security also oversees the federal government's larger ef-
fort to detect, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks on the United
States, an effort that in one way or another draws support from dozens
of federal departments and agencies. 26' The federal government may
also enlist the help of state and local authorities in its investigative
efforts if necessary. 262 The multi-agency nature of the government's
investigation of international terrorism is evidenced by the fact that,
since September 11, 2001, federal prosecutors have identified several
investigative groups other than the FBI as the "lead agency" in cases of
international terrorism referred to the Department ofJustice for pros-
ecution, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Secret
Service, Customs Service, Internal Revenue Service, Postal Service,
and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, as well as various parts
of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, State, Trans-
portation, and Treasury. 263
Of all the branches of the federal government that assist the FBI
in its efforts to detect, investigate, and apprehend suspected interna-
tional terrorists, the CIA, which has been monitoring international
terrorism for decades, 264 is uniquely positioned to assist law
enforcement.
260 See Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 8, 2001).
261 These departments and agencies include the Department of Treasury, the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, the Department of Transportation, the Department of State, the Department of the
Interior, the Department of Energy, the Department of Labor, the Department of Com-
merce, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Agriculture, the Coast
Guard, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Border Patrol, the Transportation
Security Administration, the Customs Service, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the Environmental Protection Agency. See generally OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (2002) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY], http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/book.pdf (describing the organ-
ization and function of the newly created Department of Homeland Security); OFFICE Of
HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 13-14 (2002) [herein-
after NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY], http://www.whitehouse.gov/home-
land/book/nat-strat_hls.pdf (outlining the Department of Homeland Security's approach
to detection and prevention of terrorism).
262 See DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 261, at 3; NATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 261, at 49-50.
263 See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Referrals for Federal Prosecution
Under Terrorism Programs Since September 11 by Lead Agency, at http://trac.syr.edu/
tracreports/terrorism/supp/agency-ref.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
264 See ANGELO CODEVILLA, INFORMING STATECRAFT: INTELLIGENCE FOR A NEW CENTURY
92-93 (1992) (discussing intelligence operations on international terrorists in the 1960s
and 1970s). Executive Order 12,333, issued by President Reagan in 1981, gives the CIA the
authority to "participate in law enforcement activities to investigate or prevent... interna-
tional terrorist or narcotics activities." Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec.
4, 1981). Congress recently amended the National Security Act of 1947 to include under
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Human intelligence (HUMINT), the collection of which is prima-
rily the responsibility of the CIA,265 promises to be the most valuable
form of intelligence in the war on terrorism. Legislators and policy
makers have long been aware of the value of HUMINT in investigat-
ing and preventing international terrorism. 266 Former CIA Director
James Woolsey has observed that
[i]t is not as if there are a large number of ways to find out what
terrorists are going to do .... Espionage in this arena is really all
we have going for us.... If you want to learn what Hizbollah is going
to target next, you have to learn it the old fashioned way-you have
to spy on them. 2
6 7
the definition of "foreign intelligence" subject to collection by the CIA any information
relating to "international terrorist activities." See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, § 902, 115 Stat. 272, 387 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 401a).
265 See Scorr D. BRECKINRIDGE, THlE CIA AND THE U.S INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 103 (1986);
MARK M. LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM SECRETS TO POLICY 29 (2000).
266 See, e.g., Report of the National Commission on Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 106th Cong. 2 (2000) (statement of Sen. Richard C. Shelby) (observ-
ing that "intelligence, particularly human intelligence, [plays a crucial role] in countering
international terrorism"); id. at 17 (statement of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, Il, Chair-
man, National Commission on Terrorism) (noting that "[y]ou have to have a program
which is not too risk-adverse, which tries, first of all, of course, to prevent the [terrorist]
attacks, which largely depends on good intelligence.... Human intelligence. It's number
one, number two. It's about number one through nine"); Terrorism and Intelligence Opera-
tions: Hearing Before the J Econ. Comm., 105th Cong. 80 (1998) (statement of Brian P.
Fairchild) (explaining that "[m]any argue that technical intelligence is easier to collect,
more accurate, and much more straightforward than human intelligence. Nothing could
be further from the truth. The fact of the matter is, because of emerging encryption tech-
nologies, technical intelligence has become very difficult, and sometimes, impossible to
collect"); COMM'N ON THE ROLES AND CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE CMTY., 103n
CONG., PREPARING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: AN APPRAISAL OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE 61 (Comm.
Print 1996) [hereinafter PREPARING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY], http://www.gpo.gov/su docs/
dpos/epubs/int/pdf/report.html. In 1996, a Staff Study by the Permanent Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence reported that Strategic Intelligence Reviews conducted by the National
Security Council found that HUMINT would be of critical importance in providing infor-
mation on terrorism:
Within several important specific subject areas, HUMINT's contribution is
particularly strong, such as in reporting on the transnational issues that are
now among the highest priorities of the [intelligence community]: terror-
ism, narcotics, proliferation, and international economics. In providing in-
formation on terrorism, HUMINT garnered the grade "of critical value"
almost 75 percent of the time it was given ....
... Thus, of all the intelligence collection techniques, clandestine op-
erations have a comparative advantage in collecting on most transnational
issues.
See STAFF STUDY, HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 104TH CONG.,
IC21: THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 186, 188 (Comm. Print 1996)
[hereinafter INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY], available at http://
www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/intel/ic2l/ic2ltoc.html.
267 Discussion of International Terrorism and American Security (Apr. 21, 1996), LEXIS,
News Library, Poltrn File.
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In 1996, a congressional commission charged with reviewing the effi-
cacy and appropriateness of U.S. intelligence activities in the post-
Cold War global environment reported that
the function of collecting human intelligence is essential. Signals
intelligence and other forms of technical collection are extremely
valuable and frequently are the best source of information about
some targets. Such forms of collection also are less likely to cause
diplomatic and political flaps. They do not, however, provide suffi-
cient access to targets such as terrorists or drug dealers who under-
take their activities in secret or to the plans and intentions of
foreign governments that are deliberately concealed from the
outside world. Recruiting human sources-as difficult, imperfect,
and risky as it is-often provides the only means of such access. 268
The CIA can provide various forms of assistance in the context of
international terrorism, but it assists law enforcement's investigative
efforts primarily by providing tips and investigative leads to the FBI.2 69
Occasionally, the information regards specific threats, but more often
it consists of names, phone numbers, and information about commer-
cial transactions or other information that may be useful to the FBI.270
Regular communication between the FBI and CIA is assured by the
operation of the FBI Counterterrorism Center, which was established
in 1996 to enhance cooperation among and integration of law en-
forcement and elements of the intelligence community, including the
CIA, in the war on international terrorism. 71 The FBI Counterterror-
ism Center employs several resources to accomplish its goals, includ-
ing multi-agency task forces, ongoing liaison with federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies, and its Legal Attach6 program.272
Analysts from over a dozen federal agencies working at the Center,
including a CIA analyst with access to the CIA's foreign networks, op-
erate special computers that permit them to tap into their home fed-
eral agencies' intelligence databases and pull up information for the
FBI.27 3 Oftentimes, law enforcement is able to follow up on intelli-
gence leads by "asking fresh questions of intelligence assets in the
268 PREPARING FOR THE 2lsT CENTURY, supra note 266, at 64.
269 See PILLAR, supra note 1, at 117. Prior to 1995, pursuant to a Memorandum of
Understanding between the Justice Department and the intelligence community, the intel-
ligence community reported information discovered during the course of intelligence col-
lection relating to observed criminal activities by third parties. See PREPARING FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY, supra note 266, at 282-83. However, the intelligence community now reports
only "suspected significant criminal misconduct" violations committed by its officers, em-
ployees, contractors, or agents. See id. at 283.
270 PILLAR, supra note 1, at 117.
271 For additional background information on the FBI's Counterterrorism Center, see
John F. Lewis, Jr., Fighting Terrorism in the 21st Century, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Mar.
1999, at 3, 7-8.
272 Id. at 8.
273 Jim McGee, The Rise of the FBI, WASH. POST MAG., July 20, 1997, at 10, 26.
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field. ' 274 The FBI and CIA frequently swap low-level personnel under
this program, allowing FBI agents to work in the CIA's centers, such as
the Center for International Terrorism, and allowing CIA employees
to work at law enforcement agencies. 27 5
The level of CIA cooperation is enhanced by laws authorizing the
FBI to "task" the omnipresent clandestine intelligence apparatus 276 to
identify potential informants who may have information about the
plans and activities of foreign terrorists, and also to investigate the
international activities of specific suspected terrorists.2 77 Previous in-
vestigations suggest that this authority has been used before. 278 Spe-
cifically, § 403-5a permits the CIA, upon request, to collect
information abroad on noncitizens in connection with an investiga-
tion, providing in relevant part:
(a) authority to provide assistance .... [E]lements of the intelli-
gence community may, upon the request of a United States law en-
forcement agency, collect information outside the United States
about individuals who are not United States persons. Such elements
may collect such information notwithstanding that the law enforce-
ment agency intends to use the information collected for purposes
274 PILLAR, supra note 1, at 118.
275 See U.S. Government's Response to International Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary
Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, FBI), http://
www.fi.gov/congress/congress98/terror.htm; Buntin, supra note 15, at 42-43.
276 The "intelligence community" is a conglomerate of government offices and agen-
cies, including the CIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and the intelligence
elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Coast
Guard. See 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4) (2000). The CIA and DIA are the important producers of
"finished" intelligence-single reports that bring together separate pieces of specialized
analysis and paint a comprehensive picture of a particular circumstance. See LOWENrHAL,
supra note 265, at 54.
277 See Intelligence Authorization Act of 1996 § 814(a), 50 U.S.C. § 403-5a. In addi-
tion, Executive Order 12,333 permits the CtA to "participate in law enforcement activities
to investigate or prevent... international terrorist or narcotics activities." Exec. Order No.
12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981).
278 See Investigation of September 11 Intelligence Failures: J. Hearing Before the S. Intelligence
Comm. and House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong., LEXIS, News Library,
Poltrn File (remarks by Louis Freeh, Former Director, FBI) ("As these committees have
known for several years, the FBI and the CIA have carried out joint operations around the
world to disrupt, exploit and recover evidence on Al Qaida operatives who have targeted
the United States. These operations [are] in part designed to obtain admissible evidence
.... ") [hereinafter Investigation of September 11 Intelligence Failures]. After the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing, the CIA gathered information on persons connected with Osama
bin Laden in Kenya and Tanzania. See Gregory L. Vistica & Daniel Klaidman, Tracking
Terror: Inside the FBI and CIA 'sJoint Battle to Roll up Osama bin Laden's International Network,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1998, at 46, 48. When the U.S. embassies in these countries were
bombed in 1995, FBI investigators relied on information provided by the CIA. See id.
"When agents hit the ground in Africa they had names, places and telephone numbers,"
said one senior FBI official. Id.
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of a law enforcement investigation or counterintelligence
investigation. 2 79
Section 403-5a was part of a larger bill that sought to counter the per-
ceived lack of interagency coordination in the federal government's
response to transnational threats such as terrorism.2s °1 The Senate
concluded that law enforcement could not effectively combat interna-
tional terrorism without the assistance of the intelligence community,
noting in its report accompanying the legislation that "the need to
combat terrorism . . .and other transnational threats effectively re-
quires that the capabilities of the Intelligence Community be har-
nessed to support law enforcement agencies as efficiently as
possible." 28 1 The legislation also created the Committee on Transna-
tional Threats of the National Security Council, which is designed, in
part, to "develop policies and procedures to ensure the effective shar-
ing of information among federal departments and agencies, includ-
ing between the law enforcement and foreign policy communities;
and develop guidelines for coordination of federal law enforcement
and intelligence activities overseas."28 2
279 50 U.S.C. § 403-5a.
280 See S. REP. No. 104-258, at 35 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N 3945, 3980.
The Senate Committee noted:
CIA and NSA currently interpret their legal authorities as permitting
them to engage in intelligence collection only for a "foreign intelligence"
purpose. (NSA believes that the "primary" purpose of the collection must
be to obtain foreign intelligence.) The Brown Commission concluded that
the Intelligence Community may be taking to [sic] restrictive a view regard-
ing whether intelligence assets can be tasked by law enforcement agencies
to collect information overseas about non-U.S. persons. The law enforce-
ment proviso of the National Security Act was intended to prohibit the CIA
from infringing on the domestic jurisdiction of the FBI and from becoming
a national secret police that might be directed against U.S. citizens. These
concerns are not present when the Intelligence Community collects against
foreign persons outside the U.S.
[This legislation clarifies] that [the] CIA is not violating the law en-
forcement proviso if it collects intelligence overseas about non-U.S. persons
at the request of a law enforcement agency and would also ensure that
[the] CIA, NSA, and other collection agencies apply the same standard
when responding to law enforcement requests.
Id.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 28. The Senate Committee noted:
A number of federal departments and agencies play important roles in
combating transnational threats, but their activities are not well coordi-
nated. Moreover, in the absence of higher level direction, law enforcement
agencies have usually been left to take the lead. This has often resulted in
conflicts with other agencies, including the Intelligence Community. In
the Committee's view, a high-level group is needed to decide, as a policy
matter, when to give priority to law enforcement, to intelligence, or to for-
eign policy or other considerations in responding to transnational threats.
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C. The Prosecutor's Duty to Search the Intelligence Community
Under the Circuit Approaches
Considering the relationship between law enforcement and the
intelligence community in the federal government's investigation of
international terrorism, it is not difficult to see how the courts of ap-
peals' standards regarding a prosecutor's duty to search other arms of
the government for Brady material could be construed to require fed-
eral prosecutors to search the intelligence community during criminal
prosecutions of international terrorists. The availability/accessibility
standard, regardless of whether the trial court imposes the same-sover-
eignty requirement, the same-jurisdiction requirement, or recognizes
the good-faith search exception, considers only whether a prosecutor
has access to the Brady material. 23 The federal government's primary
law enforcement entity, the FBI, is undoubtedly a part of the same
sovereign as the federal government's intelligence community and is
within the same jurisdiction. The prosecution team standard, on the
other hand, focuses on the relationship between the government en-
tity and the prosecutor's office, looking at the nature of the assistance
provided and the extent of cooperation on a particular investiga-
tion.284 As discussed in Part II.A, the circuits are split on whether a
prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material extends to agencies that
have no interest in the prosecution, extends only to law enforcement
entities, extends only to persons acting under the direction or control
of a prosecutor, or extends to Brady material outside a prosecutor's
jurisdiction. 2 5 Despite this split, one can imagine a trial court ac-
cepting any or all of the following arguments to conclude that a prose-
cutor, under any of the standards, must search the intelligence
community for Brady material when prosecuting an international ter-
rorist: (1) The intelligence community, which has an interest in
preventing international terrorism,28 6 has an interest in the prosecu-
tion of international terrorists because the prosecutions have the ef-
fect of preventing terrorism; (2) The intelligence community is acting
as a quasi-law-enforcement entity insofar as it is cooperating exten-
sively with law enforcement 28 7 to provide invaluable assistance in the
apprehension and prosecution of suspected international terrorists;
and (3) The intelligence community is acting at the direction and
283 See supra Part II.B.
284 See supra Part II.A.
285 See supra Part II.A.
286 See supra note 263.
287 See supra Part III.B; see also Investigation of September 11 Intelligence Failures, supra note
278 (statement of Louis Freeh, Former Director, FBI) ("The cases that were worked in New
York, again, we have dedicated FBI, CIA teams working overseas, exploiting information,
conducting counterterrorism operations for intelligence purposes and simultaneously ob-
taining evidence, maintaining chains of custody and using it in evidence.").
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control of the prosecution insofar as federal law empowers law en-
forcement to task the intelligence community to investigate the activi-
ties of suspected international terrorists on its behalf.288
Perhaps anticipating these judicial determinations, the U.S. At-
torneys' Manual acknowledges that prosecutors could in certain cases
be called upon to search the intelligence community for Brady mate-
rial under either the prosecution team or availability/accessibility
standard. The Manual provides that, "[als a general rule, a prosecu-
tor should not seek access to [intelligence community] files except
when ... the facts of the case [create] an affirmative obligation to do
so."239 However, the Manual identifies four situations in which a pros-
ecutor must search the intelligence community for Brady material, in-
cluding instances in which the intelligence community has been an
active participant in the investigation or prosecution of a case, and
instances in which known facts and the nature of a case suggest that
there may be Brady material within the intelligence community. 290
The search requirements in these situations are based on the Depart-
ment of Justice's understanding of the search requirements imposed
by the circuits' prosecution team and availability/accessibility stan-
dards described in Part 11.291
A prosecutorial duty to search the intelligence community's files
in international terrorism prosecutions, under any of the circuit ap-
proaches, could paralyze the government's efforts to investigate inter-
national terrorism. Although the intelligence community can gather
some HUMINT through non-clandestine activities,292 its collection
largely involves sending officers to foreign countries where they at-
288 See supra notes 276-82 and accompanying text.
289 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 2052 (2002), http://www.
usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-readingroom/usam/title9/crmO2052.htm.
290 Id. Another situation in which a prosecutor must search the intelligence commu-
nity for Brady material arises in a case in which the prosecution believes that the defendant
may have had, or as part of her defense at trial will assert that he has had, contacts with the
intelligence community. Id. This situation normally arises if the defendant claims that his
actions were authorized by the intelligence community. See id. The final situation is a case
in which the facts of a case lead a prosecutor to conclude that he should initiate a "pruden-
tial search" of intelligence community files-a search based not upon a known duty to the
defendant or to a known nexus to national security matters, but rather on the fact that the
case meets a certain profile of cases likely to implicate such issues. See id. In these types of
cases, which may involve international terrorism, the search is designed to assist the prose-
cution in identifying and managing potential classified information problems before in-
dictment and trial. See id.
291 See id. The Criminal Resource Manual relies on the Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Cir-
cuits' Antone, Fairman, and Brooks decisions for its discussion of the prosecution team stan-
dard, and it relies on the Third Circuit's Perdomo and the Fifth Circuit's Deutsch decisions
for its discussion of the availability/accessibility standard. See id.
292 See PAT M. HOLT, SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 68 (1995).
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tempt to recruit foreign nationals-also known as "agents"-to spy.293
Spying provides the greatest access to information about the identi-
ties, plans, activities, exact locations, planned targets, and, if possible,
information about the vulnerabilities of technologically advanced 294
and covert international terror networks.2 95 The intelligence commu-
nity considers HUMINT sources to be extremely fragile because they
take so long to recruit and develop 29 6 and because HUMINT opera-
293 LOWENTHAL, supra note 265, at 67. An agent is someone who accepts a clandestine
mission from an American representative even though he is not employed in a staff capac-
ity by the CIA. See BRECEINRIDGE, supra note 265, at 123. Not all agents are "primary
sources of intelligence." Id. Agents are often access points to other sources-people who
do not have a formalized relationship with the CIA but who occasionally are willing to tell
CIA officers (full-time career employees at CIA headquarters or at CIA stations around the
world) or agents some of what they know. See id.; Hour, supra note 292, at 69.
294 Intelligence specialists believe that Osama bin Laden has the necessary technology
to avoid attempts to track his movements and conversations. See Dreyfuss, supra note 239,
at 11. For example, terrorists can "encrypt cell phone transmissions, steal cell phone num-
bers and program them into a single phone, or use prepaid cell phone cards purchased
anonymously to keep their communications secure." Zanini & Edwards, supra note 241, at
38. Observers believe that "[c]ommercial programmers have already written encryption
software that is, for all practical purposes, unbreakable." BRUCE D. BERKOWITZ & ALLAN E.
GOODMAN, BEST TRUTH: INTELLIGENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 19 (2000); see TREVERTON,
supra note 255, at 88. Some terrorist organizations may already possess such technology:
Rumors persist that the French police have been unable to decrypt the
hard disk on a portable computer belonging to a captured member of the
Spanish/Basque organization ETA. It has also been suggested that Israeli
security forces were unsuccessful in their attempts at cracking the codes
used by Hamas to send instructions for terrorist attacks over the Internet.
Zanini & Edwards, supra note 241, at 38 (citations omitted).
295 See Hulnick, supra note 244, at 277.
296 One of the most difficult aspects of collecting HUMINT is the recruitment of for-
eign agents. HOLT, supra note 292, at 69. After identifying groups of people who are likely
to have valuable information, the CIA must then identify persons within this group who are
likely to be vulnerable to recruitment. Id. A variety of characteristics can make a target
vulnerable, including any financial difficulties, political sympathies, or personal grudges he
might have that make him easy prey for blackmail. id.
Case officers must carefully cultivate potential agents without revealing their CIA con-
nection because successful clandestine collection of foreign intelligence requires that of-
ficers responsible for developing agents maintain the secrecy of their true identity. See
BRECKINRIDGE, supra note 265, at 120. They Must have some plausible cover-some reason
for being in the foreign nation-that deflects special attention. Id. at 121. Cover may be
official (e.g., holding a government job outside of the embassy) or non-official (often an
ostensible position with a CIA-created and controlled business). Id. Although official
cover makes contact with the government easier, it also makes discovery of one's true iden-
tity easier. See id. at 122. Cultivating potential agents is a process that can take years before
the CIA decides either to recruit or abandon them. HOLT, supra note 292, at 69. For a
description of the two-step interview and recruitment approach once used by one station in
the former West Germany, see George G. Bull, The Elicitation Interview, in INSIDE CIA's
PRIVATE WORLD: DECLASSIFIED ARTICLES FROM THE AGENCY'S INTERNAL JOURNAL, 1955-1992,
at 63 (H. Bradford Westerfield ed., 1995).
Should the potential agent agree to spy for the CIA, indoctrination or even training
will follow, depending on the maturity and experience of the agent. BRECKINRIDGE, supra
note 265, at 123. The officer may, for example, provide training to enable the agent to
mask his relationship with the officer. ARTHUR S. HULNICK, FIXING THE SPY MACHINE 35
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tions involve so much risk to both case officers and potential
agents. 297 Due to the value of agents' contributions to intelligence
gathering, the identities of agents are some of the most sensitive
secrets of the intelligence community.2 98 If a source were disclosed,
the organization that the source had penetrated could take steps to
eliminate the source or to turn the source into a means of counter-
intelligence.2 99 Subjecting the intelligence community's files to a
prosecutor's disclosure obligation could force the government to re-
veal to international terrorist networks its sources and methods of
surveilling terrorist organizations. This disclosure could, in turn, per-
mit these groups to eliminate agents and engage in effective
counterintelligence.
Despite the vast amount of money spent investigating interna-
tional terrorism, 30° 1 intelligence on international terrorist networks is,
and promises to remain, difficult to obtain. 30 The CIA has had ex-
treme difficulty in collecting such information thus far.3° 2 Several ob-
stacles stand in the way. One obstacle is the steady decline of
HUMINT collectors over the past decade: between 1990 and 1996, the
CIA reduced the number of "core HUMINT collectors" by over thirty
percent.303 Current and former intelligence officers report that the
CIA now possesses a "deteriorated human-intelligence capability that
makes it almost impossible to penetrate key targets such as terrorist
organizations and cripples U.S. efforts to detect and prevent terrorist
(1999). The case officer may train the agent how to use photographic and recording
equipment, how to conceal documents, and how to communicate with the officer. Id.
297 LOWENTHAL, supra note 265, at 68. Gregory Treverton, senior policy analyst at
RAND and former Vice Chair of the National Intelligence Council, observed that
spying ... is a target-of-opportunity enterprise. What spies may hear or
steal today, or be able to communicate to their American case officers, they
may not hear or see or be able to get out tomorrow. What is decisive today
may be unobtainable tomorrow. Worse, the crisis moments when informa-
tion from spies is most valuable to us may be precisely when they are most
exposed, when to communicate with them is to run the greatest risk of
disclosing their connection to us.
TREVERTON, supra note 255, at 152.
298 HOLT, supra note 292, at 73.
299 See id.
300 See supra note 239.
301 Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, tes-
tified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that "[t]he characteristics of the
most effective terrorist organizations-highly compartmented operations planning, good
cover and security, extreme suspicion of outsiders, and ruthlessness-make them very hard
intelligence targets." Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: Hear-
ing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 106th Cong. 24 (2000) (statement of Vice Admi-
ral Thomas R. Wilson, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency).
302 See Seymour M. Hersh, What Went Wrong: The C.I.A. and the Failure of American Intelli-
gence, NEW YORKER, Oct. 8, 2001, at 34;J. Michael Waller, Blinded Vigilance, INSIGHT ON THE
NEWS, Oct. 15, 2001, at 14; Dreyfuss, supra note 239, at 10.
303 See INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 266, at 193.
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attacks. '3 0 4 Another obstacle is the fact that the CIA's HUMINT oper-
ations rely heavily on case officers operating under official cover,30 5 a
designation that makes it virtually impossible for them to recruit
agents with connections to terrorist organizations. 3116 However, even
if the CIA were to attempt to modify its cover operations to penetrate
international terrorist networks, 3117 it might not be able to find case
officers willing to take the assignments under non-official cover.118
Moreover, even if case officers were willing to serve under non-official
cover, virtually none of the case officers and agents remaining in the
CIA has the appropriate cover or language training to penetrate ter-
rorist cells or to recruit agents in foreign countries. 0 9 This language
304 J. Michael Waller, Ground Down CIA Still in the Pit, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Oct. 1,
2001, at 19, 20. Congress has taken steps to remove limitations on source recruitment.
President Bush signed legislation on December 28, 2001 directing the current Director of
Intelligence to rescind guidelines previously established in 1995 by then Director of Intelli-
gence John Deutch governing the use of foreign assets or sources with criminal or human
rights concerns. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
108, § 403, 115 Stat. 1394, 1403; Tim Weiner, CIA Re-examines Hiring of Ex-Terrorist as Agent,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995, at Al. These guidelines apparently led to the removal of hun-
dreds of foreign agents from the CIA payroll, causing what one reporter described as a
"devastating effect on anti-terrorist operations in the Middle East." Hersh, supra note 302,
at 40. In instructing the CIA director to rescind these rules, Congress stated that the previ-
ous guidelines failed to fully address the "challenges of both existing and long-term threats
to United States security." Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 § 403, 115
Stat. at 1403. The legislation directed the CIA director to issue new guidelines that
more appropriately weigh and incentivize risks to ensure that qualified field
intelligence officers can, and should, swiftly and directly gather intelligence
from human sources in such a fashion as to ensure the ability to provide
timely information that would allow for indications and warnings of plans
and intentions of hostile actions or events
and which "ensure that such information is shared in a broad and expeditious fashion so
that, to the extent possible, actions to protect American lives and interests can be taken."
Id.
305 See CODEVILLA, supra note 264, at 306-09.
306 See Gerecht, supra note 241, at 40. Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former CIA operative
experienced in Middle Eastern matters, argues that "[tihe only effective way to run offen-
sive counterterrorist operations against Islamic radicals in more or less hostile territory is
with 'non-official-cover' officers-operatives who are in no way openly attached to the U.S.
government." Id.
307 There is no indication yet that the CIA has altered these operations. See id. ("But as
of late 1999 no program to insert NOCs [non-official-cover officers] into an Islamic funda-
mentalist organization abroad had been implemented, according to one .. .officer who
has served in the Middle East.").
308 TREVERTON, supra note 255, at 155 ("The disadvantages of nonofficial cover are that
it is expensive and time-consuming to implement, and given the lack of diplomatic immu-
nity, it is potentially dangerous.").
-09 For example, although the CIA does not disclose the number of specialists who
speak a specific language, CIA sources with knowledge of the agency's language capabili-
ties say that there are approximately only four or five competent Arabic speakers in the
entire CIA. Claire Berlinski, English Only Spoken Here, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 3, 2001, at 22,
22. Part of the problem appears to be that case officers who study Arabic in the United
States often serve only a single two- to three-year tour before being rotated elsewhere,
where they lose their language capabilities. Id. at 23.
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barrier compounds the CIA's official-cover problem and severely re-
stricts HUMINT capabilities in critical locations.3 ° It will take time
for the intelligence community to produce tangible results in improv-
ing its ability to monitor international terrorism.3 1t
IV
A PROPOSAL FOR A LIMITED PROSECUTORIAL DUTY TO SEARCH THE
GOVERNMENT FOR BRADY MATERIAL IN INTERNATIONAL
TERRORIST PROSECUTIONS
The previous two Parts of this Note described the various stan-
dards that the courts of appeals have applied to determine the scope
of a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material. They further ex-
plained how, in light of the extensive interagency cooperation in the
federal government's investigation of international terrorism, these
standards could be construed to require a federal prosecutor to
search the intelligence community's files in prosecutions of interna-
tional terrorists. Responding to the disclosure threat posed by the cir-
cuit approaches, this Part sets out a standard for determining the
scope of a prosecutor's duty to search the government for Brady mate-
rial. The standard serves the government's interests in protecting clas-
sified information related to international terrorism investigations
better than the current circuit approaches. This Part also explains
how the proposed standard conforms to existing Supreme Court case
law and implements all the policies that prosecutorial disclosure is in-
tended to serve.
A. The Proposed Standard and Its Requirements
A federal prosecutor's duty to discover and disclose Brady mate-
rial should extend to materials possessed by other arms of the federal
government only if the following conditions are met: First, the govern-
ment entity must have engaged in law enforcement activity under a
prosecutor's direction and control in relation to the federal govern-
ment's criminal investigation of the defendant. Second, if the first
condition is met, then a prosecutor need search only those files con-
taining materials produced as a result of the entity's law enforcement
310 A House Intelligence Report accompanying the fiscal year 2002 bill to fund intelli-
gence activities noted that "[i]ntelligence officers overseas often cannot contact and re-
cruit key potential sources because they do not possess the requisite language skills." H.R.
REP. No. 107-219, at 19 (2001). Congress also has taken steps to reduce the language
barrier. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, § 313,
116 Stat. 2391, 2391 (authorizing the creation of the National Virtual Translation Center).
311 Perhaps being optimistic, a retired CIA case officer experienced in Middle East
affairs recently told a Newsweek reporter that it would take the CIA "six years to build an
intelligence service capable of 'seeding' agents into the radical Islamic underworld."
Thomas, supra note 241, at 36.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
activity. Third, if the government entity engaged in law enforcement
activities under the direction and control of a prosecutor's law en-
forcement investigative arm (as opposed to the prosecutor himself),
then the defendant must request the exculpatory or impeachment
material with enough specificity to indicate to the prosecutor both the
material's location within the federal government and its nature.31 2
These three conditions serve several valuable purposes. The first
condition of the proposed standard requires that the material subject
to a prosecutor's disclosure obligation be the product of law enforce-
ment activity conducted under a prosecutor's direction and con-
trol.-"'- This condition is designed both to ensure that a prosecutor
has actual notice of the likelihood that another government entity
may possess Brady material, and to create safe harbors for government
agencies that do not wish to be subject to a prosecutor's disclosure
obligation. The "direction and control" element of this condition rec-
ognizes that certain activities (e.g., intercepting electronic and tele-
phonic communications, recording statements, and collecting
materials for analysis) conducted by government entities not acting
under a prosecutor's direction and control should not subject the en-
tity to a prosecutor's disclosure obligation merely because its investiga-
tive activities in relation to someone who is or may become a criminal
defendant resemble law enforcement activity designed to support a
criminal investigation and prosecution. Unless the government entity
conducts law enforcement activity under the direction and control of
a prosecutor, there is no reasonable basis for concluding that the
312 One should not confuse this proposed standard with the prosecution team stan-
dard. The prosecution team standard gives no indication that a prosecutor need search
only those files containing materials produced as a result of law enforcement activity con-
ducted tnder the direction and control of a prosecutor. See supra Part II.A. Second, the
prosecution team standard does not impose a specific request requirement in cases in
which the government entity has not engaged in law enforcement activity under the direc-
tion and control of a prosecutor. See supra Part II.A. Thus, unlike the proposed standard,
the prosecution team standard does not require that a prosecutor have actual notice in
these circumstances as to the location and nature of the files that he is supposed to dis-
cover and disclose to the defendant.
3134 The "law enforcement" element of this condition recognizes that not all investiga-
tive activity conducted by a government entity in relation to someone who is or may be-
come a criminal defendant is "law enforcement activity"-activity that is designed to assist
in the prosecution of the defendant. Only that activity designed either to assist in the
collection of evidence for use in a criminal prosecution or to provide trial assistance is "law
enforcement activity." Such activities might include identifying and interviewing potential
trial witnesses; taking witness statements for a prosecutor; contacting persons for the pur-
pose of securing their testimony; conducting searches and seizures; collecting and analyz-
ing demonstrative evidence; taking persons into custody for interrogation; discussing
matters with federal prosecutors; and participating in a defendant's trial by providing testi-
monial, documentary, or demonstrative evidence. Of course, investigative activity con-
ducted under the direction and control of a prosecutor almost certainly will be "law
enforcement activity," for a prosecutor would have no other purpose in directing and con-
trolling the activity than the furtherance of a criminal investigation or prosecution.
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prosecution has notice that the entity might have evidence that quali-
fies as Brady material. In addition, the condition permits a govern-
ment entity that wishes to avoid being subject to a prosecutor's
disclosure obligations to a specific defendant (because, for example, it
is itself investigating the defendant) to do so by avoiding a specific
relationship with a prosecutor or by declining to engage in specific
forms of investigative conduct under the prosecutor's direction and
control.
The second condition of the proposed standard limits a prosecu-
tor's search obligation to those files containing materials produced as
a result of law enforcement activity conducted under a prosecutor's
direction and control. This condition is designed to ensure that crim-
inal defendants are not permitted (through a prosecutor) to search
sensitive government documents indiscriminately. Limiting a prose-
cutor's search obligation to files containing materials produced as a
result of directed and controlled law enforcement activity shields from
a prosecutor's discovery and disclosure obligations those files not con-
taining materials produced under those circumstances. Thus, under
the proposed standard, if a government entity engages in both investi-
gative activity under the direction and control of a prosecutor and
also independent and undirected investigative activity, a prosecutor
need search only those files containing materials produced as a result
of the directed and controlled activity. In the context of the govern-
ment's investigation of international terrorism, the proposed standard
would permit elements of the intelligence community to structure
their record retention procedures so that they could assist in an inves-
tigation without thereby exposing all of their materials relating to the
target of a criminal investigation to a prosecutor's disclosure
obligation.
The third condition requires defendants, in those cases in which
a government entity has engaged in investigative activity on behalf of
law enforcement but not under a prosecutor's direction and control,
to bring the material within the prosecution's search obligation by re-
questing the material with sufficient specificity to indicate both its lo-
cation within government and nature. The requirement is designed
to limit the burden imposed by the Brady search duty by requiring that
prosecutors be given some notice as to which arm of the government
may possess Brady material. As noted in Part III.B, dozens of federal
agencies are involved in the federal government's general investiga-
tion of international terrorism, 314 and even greater numbers of state
and local law enforcement agencies may be involved in a particular
federal investigation. 31 5 Although a federal prosecutor likely would
314 See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
'115 See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
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know which arm of the government has taken the lead in investigating
and collecting evidence on his behalf and under his direction and
control, 16 he likely would not know the nature and extent of each
and every federal, state, and local government entity's involvement in
the federal investigation of a defendant, even if those entities engaged
in activity under the direction and control of his law enforcement in-
vestigative arm. Consider the consequences, for example, if the FBI
were to receive four hundred tips from anonymous sources, eleven
different federal entities, and six foreign agencies in response to a
public request for assistance during the course of a three-year FBI in-
vestigation of an international terrorist network. A general request
for Brady material, alone, would not provide a prosecutor with suffi-
cient notice of the potential existence of Brady material within the
government. Unless the defendant directs the prosecution's attention
toward a particular government entity and toward specific files within
that entity, a general Brady request would be unreasonably burden-
some. The prosecutor would be forced to devote his limited resources
to searching indiscriminately each and every federal or state entity
with a possible connection to the government's investigation of the
defendant, and to identifying each of the thousands of records within
those entities that may contain Brad--as opposed to merely relevant-
material.3 17
B. The Proposed Standard's Fidelity to Supreme Court
Precedent
The scope of the prosecutorial duty to search for Brady material
proposed in Part IV.A is consistent with Brady and its Supreme Court
progeny. Because the specific request requirement that the proposed
316 For a listing of all federal agencies making international terrorism referrals-495
referrals in all-to federal prosecutors between October 2001 and March 2002, see Transac-
tional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 263. Attorney General guidelines provide
that special agents heading any FBI investigation must maintain periodic contact with the
appropriate federal prosecutor as circumstances require and as requested by the prosecu-
tor, and must present all relevant facts to the federal prosecutor if an investigation warrants
prosecution. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES,
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS 11 (2002), http://
www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf. These guidelines also provide that if an investiga-
tion produces credible information concerning criminal activity outside the FBI's investiga-
tive jurisdiction, the FBI field office must, subject to some exceptions, transmit the
information or refer the complaint to law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction. Id. at
11-12. A similar prosecutorial notice requirement applies when the FBI conducts a terror-
ism enterprise investigation, which is designed to obtain information concerning the na-
ture and structure of a specific terrorist enterprise. See id. at 17.
317 Recall that Brady material is evidence that is material to guilt or punishment; only
evidence whose nondisclosure would undermine confidence in a trial result is Brady mate-
rial. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 682 (1985).
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standard imposes in certain circumstances is likely to arise often, 3 18
and because, on its face, the requirement is the one most likely to be
characterized as inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, this sub-
part discusses it first. Section 2 discusses the fidelity of the other limi-
tations to Supreme Court precedent.
1. The Specific Request Requirement
Supreme Court precedent does not foreclose the imposition of a
specific request requirement in cases in which a government entity
has engaged in law enforcement activity not under a prosecutor's di-
rection and control, but rather on behalf of law enforcement entities.
Brady itself held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment."319 Neverthe-
less, in Agurs, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor must disclose
Brady material even if he receives no Brady request at all. However,
the Agurs opinion clearly indicates that the Court understood this
duty to be limited to materials in a prosecutor's actual possession:
In many cases .... exculpatory information in the possession of the
prosecutor may be unknown to defense counsel. In such a situation
he may make no request at all, or possibly ask for "all Brady mate-
rial" or for "anything exculpatory." Such a request really gives the
prosecutor no better notice than if no request is made. If there is a
duty to respond to a general request of that kind, it must derive
from the obviously exculpatory character of certain evidence in the
hands of the prosecutor. But if the evidence is so clearly supportive of a
claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to
produce, that duty should equally arise even if no request is
made. 320
One could fairly construe Agurs to require that a prosecutor disclose
Brady material in his possession even absent a specific request, given
that Agurs involved Brady material knowingly possessed by a prosecu-
tor.3 2 1 One cannot, however, fairly construe Agurs to require that a
prosecutor search also for Brady material not in his knowledge or pos-
session in the absence of a specific Brady request. In other words, a
318 As one may imagine, in the context of an international terrorism investigation (and
perhaps any investigation), the intelligence community likely would be involved long
before the investigation reaches the point at which the lead investigative entity-most
likely the FBI-would refer the matter to a prosecutor. Thus, in any given terrorism inves-
tigation, the intelligence community's involvement might be limited to pre-referral liaisons
with a federal law enforcement agency, not a federal prosecutor.
319 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (emphasis added).
320 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976) (emphases added).
321 See id. at 101 (noting that although the government argued on appeal only that the
prosecutor had no duty to disclose absent a request, it apparently did not argue that the
prosecutor lacked knowledge or possession of Brady material).
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fair reading of Agurs compels the conclusion that the Court did not
require a Brady request in that case for the sole reason that the prose-
cution already had notice of the Brady materials in its possession.3 22
Although its Agurs opinion appeared to limit the circumstances in
which a prosecutor must produce Brady material absent a request, the
Supreme Court subsequently, and without justification, construed
Agurs to require that a prosecutor search for Brady material not within
his knowledge or possession even in the absence of a specific Brady
request. In Bagley, which found that a prosecutor had suppressed evi-
dence, the Court relied on Agurs for the proposition that a prosecutor
violates his Brady obligations regardless of whether the defendant has
made a request for Brady material "if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence [possessed by the government] been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent."3'2 3 For two reasons, however, one should not construe Bagley as
controlling law on the specific request issue in cases in which the gov-
ernment entity to be searched is not the prosecution's investigative
arm. First, because the defendant in Bagley had in fact made a specific
request for the undisclosed material,3 24 the issue of whether a defen-
dant must make a specific Brady request in cases in which the prosecu-
tion has neither knowledge nor possession of Brady material was not
before the Court. Therefore, the Court's broad assertion is mere dic-
tum. Second, even if the Court's dictum were binding, because the
alleged prosecutorial nondisclosure in Bagley involved evidence
known only to and held by the prosecutor's law enforcement investi-
gative arm,32 5 it is not clear how Bagley's enunciated rule-that a pros-
322 The Supreme Court's Giglio opinion also failed to indicate whether a defendant is
required to make a specific request for Brady material. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150 (1972). However, Giglio does not provide any inferential guidance on this issue be-
cause, like Agurs, Giglio involved Brady material in the actual possession of the prosecution.
Id. at 150-51.
323 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). The Court relied on Bagley's
search requirement language in two subsequent cases. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the Court
relied on Bagley for the proposition that "the obligation to disclose exculpatory material
does not depend on the presence of a specific request." 480 U.S. 39, 58 n.15 (1987). The
Ritchie Court came to this unwarranted conclusion even though the defendant in the case
had made a specific request for material within the possession of an investigative agency
(material that the agency sought to protect from disclosure), and even though the material
was known only to and held by the prosecutor's investigative arm. See id. at 43, 44 n.4. The
Court relied on Bagley again in Kyles v. Whitley for the proposition that "regardless of re-
quest, favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression
by the government, 'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been dis-
closed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different."' 514 U.S.
419, 433-34 (1995) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). Like the Ritchie Court, the Kyles
Court came to this conclusion even though the defendant made a general request for
exculpatory and impeachment material, and even though the material was known only to
and held by the prosecutor's investigative arm. See id. at 428, 438.
324 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 669-70.
325 See id. at 669-71.
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ecutor may be guilty of suppressing evidence not known to or
possessed by him even absent a specific request-follows from the
Court's holding in Agurs. Agurs eliminated Brady's specific request re-
quirement only in those cases in which obviously exculpatory material
is within a prosecutor's actual knowledge and possession,_26 presuma-
bly because it is only in this circumstance that a prosecutor already has
notice of the material. In Bagley, on the other hand, the prosecutor
did not know of or possess any obviously exculpatory material, and,
therefore, absent a specific request by the defendant, the prosecutor
could not have had notice of Brady material in the government's pos-
session. Thus, the universal no-request-needed rule announced in
Bagley does not, contrary to the Court's suggestion, follow from Agurs.
Moreover, if the Bagley Court meant to extend Agurs's scope, it offered
no rationale for the extension. For these reasons, the Court should
not construe Bagley as deciding the issue of whether a prosecutor vio-
lates his Brady obligations by failing to disclose Brady material not
known to or possessed by him or his investigative arm in cases in
which a defendant fails to give the prosecution notice of the material
by making a specific request.
2. The Law Enforcement Activity Under Prosecutorial Direction and
Control Limitation
Nor does Supreme Court precedent foreclose the proposed stan-
dard's condition that the prosecution need search only those govern-
ment entity files produced as a result of law enforcement activity
under the direction and control of the prosecution. Recall that in
Kyles, which involved a prosecutor's failure to discover and disclose
Brady material possessed by his investigative arm-the police3 27-the
Court did not explain its statement that a prosecutor's duty to search
the government for Brady material extends to entities "acting on the
government's behalf."' 328 Certainly nothing in Kyles or in any other
Brady case compels the conclusion that a government entity surveil-
ling persons monitored also by law enforcement is "acting on the gov-
ernment's behalf' for Brady purposes in those cases in which the
government entity is not acting under a prosecutor's direction and
control for the purpose of producing evidence for a criminal prosecu-
326 See supra notes 320-22 and accompanying text.
327 See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438.
328 Id. at 437. Accord Moon v. Head, 285 F.3d 1301, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002).
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tion.329 All of the Supreme Court's Brady cases, including Ritchie,330
involved Brady material possessed either by a prosecutor or by law en-
forcement entities acting in law enforcement capacities under the di-
rection and control of a prosecutor-as agents for the collection of
evidence on behalf of a prosecutor for use in criminal prosecutions.3 3'1
These are important factual characteristics because the Court, in re-
quiring the prosecutor in each of those cases to discover and disclose
Brady materials not within her possession or knowledge, did not (1)
compel a law enforcement agency to act in a capacity in which it was
neither institutionally nor financially able or willing to act;332 (2) cre-
329 Assisting law enforcement in its investigation of a defendant absent a request or
prosecutorial direction and control should not alone be sufficient to extend a prosecutor's
search obligation to the intelligence community. Without prosecutorial direction and con-
trol, any form of investigative assistance by the intelligence community related to the target
of a law enforcement investigation, such as the provision of a single anonymous tip, could
be construed as the kind of assistance that opens up all of the intelligence community's
files to the defendant.
-330 The Court's Ritchie opinion indicates that the outside agency-the Pennsylvania
Children and Youth Services (CYS)-was the state entity responsible for investigating viola-
tions of laws against the mistreatment and neglect of children. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
480 U.S. 39, 43 (1987). In Pennsylvania at the time the Court decided Ritchie, child mis-
treatment investigations were not handled by the police but instead were handed off to
CYS. See id. ("The girl reported the incidents to the police, and the matter then was re-
ferred to the CYS."). Then-existing Pennsylvania law suggests that CYS was in the habit of
passing its investigative files on to the prosecution. See id. at 43-44 n.2. Thus, although
CYS was not officially a law enforcement entity, CYS appeared to act as a law enforcement
entity for Brady purposes because it regularly collected evidence on behalf of the prosecu-
tion for use in criminal prosecutions, a function which gave rise to an institutional relation-
ship with the prosecution from which one could imply direction and control.
131 See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 273-75 (1999); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38;
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 43-44; United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 669-72 (1985); United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 100-01, 106-07 (1976); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 791-95
(1972); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 152, 154 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 84 (1963). In fact, unlike the intelligence community's investigation of international
terrorism, the law enforcement investigations in the Supreme Court's Brady cases discussed
in Part I would not have occurred but for the prosecution's need for admissible evidence.
The intelligence community, on the other hand, has a non-law-enforcement purpose for
conducting its investigation of international terrorism that is independent of law enforce-
ment's need to obtain admissible evidence. See 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d) (1) (2000) (providing
that the Director of Central Intelligence Agency shall "collect intelligence through human
sources and by other appropriate means"); id. § 401a (definingforeign intelligence as "infor-
mation relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or ele-
ments thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons"); Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46
Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981) (directing the intelligence community to "conduct intelli-
gence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the
national security of the United States," including the "[c]ollection of information concern-
ing, and the conduct of activities to protect against, intelligence activities directed against
the United States, international terrorist and international narcotics activities, and other
hostile activities directed against the United States by foreign powers, organizations, per-
sons, and their agents").
332 For a comparison of the functions and methods of the intelligence community as
opposed to that of law enforcement, see INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY,
sulpra note 266, at 272-78. Treating the intelligence community as an arm of the prosecu-
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ate a relationship between the prosecution and a law enforcement
agency that did not previously exist;3 3 3 (3) require a law enforcement
agency to produce materials that it had not already produced;3 3 4 or
(4) jeopardize a law enforcement agency's ability to fulfill its institu-
tional purpose. 335 With the exception of Ritchie, which discusses the
fourth implication, 336 none of the Court's Brady cases discusses the
above implications of extending a prosecutor's duty to search for
Brady material beyond his investigative arm. Thus, it is not clear that
Kyles, or any other Supreme Court Brady case, would compel the
courts to extend a prosecutor's search obligation to the intelligence
community in cases in which the conditions discussed in Part IV.A are
not met; i.e., if the intelligence community is not acting as a law en-
forcement entity under a prosecutor's direction and control in rela-
tion to a criminal investigation and prosecution.
tion by including its files within a prosecutor's disclosure obligation undoubtedly would
increase the costs of maintaining secrecy because it would require the intelligence commu-
nity to implement new procedures for the collection and storage of investigative records.
For example, the intelligence community would want to create and implement procedures
to ensure that employees separate materials produced as a result of engaging in law en-
forcement activity under the direction and control of a prosecutor or law enforcement
from materials that are not, even if both materials relate to the same target. Moreover, the
intelligence community presumably would have to devote more of its legal resources to
making determinations regarding which materials belong in which files. For an overview
of the costs associated with protecting government secrets from disclosure, see REPORT OF
THE COMM'N ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING Gov'T SECRECY, S. Doc. No. 105-2, at 1-16
(1997), http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy.
333 Imposing on the intelligence community the same disclosure obligations as law
enforcement regardless of the nature of its relationship with law enforcement would effec-
tively treat spies like police-it would create the impression that the intelligence commu-
nity is just another arm of the prosecution's office. This would give the Attorney General
an interest in influencing the intelligence community's collection requirements and proce-
dures-an interest presently reserved to the Director of Intelligence and the President.
334 If the courts were to extend a prosecutor's discovery and disclosure obligation to
the intelligence community, the intelligence community would no longer be solely in the
business of gathering intelligence for use by the President: it would also be in the business
of gathering evidence for prosecutors for use in criminal prosecutions. Thus, the intrinsic
nature of the intelligence community's work product would be altered.
335 Compelling a prosecutor to search his evidence-collecting arm does not jeopardize
that arm's ability to collect evidence in the future in the same way that forcing a prosecutor
to search an intelligence-collecting arm of the federal government jeopardizes that arm's
ability to collect intelligence. The intelligence community relies on confidential infor-
mants for much of its information. See supra notes 293-94. A source would be less willing
to relay intelligence were he to believe that his relationship with the intelligence commu-
nity could be discovered and disclosed by a prosecutor searching through intelligence
community files for information to pass on to criminal defendants.
336 See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60-61.
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C. The Proposed Standard's Fidelity to the Policies Underlying
Prosecutorial Disclosure
Not only is the proposed standard outlined in Part IV.A consis-
tent with Supreme Court precedent, it is also better suited to serve the
policies underlying prosecutorial disclosure than any of the existing
circuit approaches. As discussed in Part I, the prosecution's duty to
search for and disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence in the
possession of some arm of the government is intended to implement
several policies. These policies include the preservation of the adver-
sarial system of justice, the prevention of prosecutorial misconduct,
the provision of fair trials (i.e., preventing harm to defendants), the
promotion of public confidence in criminal convictions, and the ad-
ministration of accurate convictions. 37 Any standard controlling the
scope of a prosecutor's search duty must respect all of these policies.
The circuit split discussed in Part II regarding the appropriate
scope of a prosecutor's duty to search for Brady material possessed by
some arm of the government reveals that the lower courts have no
common understanding of the policies that Brady disclosure aims to
effectuate. More specifically, the courts of appeals define the scope of
Brady's search requirement in ways that effectively implement one pol-
icy to the neglect of other policies. The line of decisions following the
prosecution team standard, 338 for example, reflects those courts' im-
plicit understanding that disclosure is intended primarily to prevent
prosecutorial negligence. If these courts had understood Brady's
search requirement also to be a mechanism for ensuring the accuracy
of criminal convictions and for preventing harm to defendants, they
would not have limited the prosecution's discovery and disclosure ob-
ligation only to those law enforcement entities acting under a prose-
cutor's direction and control in a particular criminal investigation. 3 9
It is certainly not difficult to imagine that a government entity unre-
lated to a particular criminal investigation and prosecution (or even a
prosecutor's investigative arm) might possess Brady material related to
a specific defendant's prosecution that is the product of a separate,
unrelated investigation of the defendant, especially in cases involving
repeat offenders or organized crime rings. That Brady disclosure is
not intended solely to prevent prosecutorial misconduct, however, is
evident from express language in the Supreme Court's opinions. If
Brady's sole aim were to prevent prosecutorial misconduct, why would
the Supreme Court have held that a prosecutor's good or bad faith in
suppressing evidence is irrelevant? Under Brady, a prosecutor who in-
nocently overlooks Brady material in his possession is no less culpable
337 See supra Part I.A.
338 See supra Part II.A.
339 See supra Part II.A.
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than a prosecutor who intentionally withholds exculpatory or im-
peachment evidence from the defendant.340
The line of decisions following the availability/accessibility stan-
dard,34 1 on the other hand, reflect those courts' implicit understand-
ing that the disclosure rule is intended primarily to prevent harm to
defendants and to ensure the accuracy of criminal convictions. These
courts' lack of attention to the policy of preventing prosecutorial mis-
conduct is apparent from the almost unlimited scope of the search
duty they impose and from their failure to discuss the issues of notice
and administrative burden in their opinions. 34 2 That Brady disclosure
is not intended merely to ensure that defendants are not harmed and
that criminal convictions are accurate, however, is evident from the
express limits on the Brady disclosure obligation. If Brady's sole aim
were to prevent harm to defendants, why would the Supreme Court
have limited the discovery and disclosure requirement to materials
within the government's possession? Under Brady, if a prosecutor were
to suspect, for example, that a private third party might have informa-
tion that corroborates some aspect of the defendant's theory, he
would have no obligation to search for and subsequently disclose this
information to the defendant. 343 Moreover, why would the Supreme
Court limit the prosecution's discovery and disclosure duties to mate-
rial evidence-evidence that, if disclosed, gives rise to a reasonable
probability that the trial result would have been different?344 Under
Brady, if a prosecutor were aware of evidence in the possession of the
police that could be used to undermine the state's theories of guilt
but which is not so significant that its nondisclosure would undermine
confidence in the trial's result, the prosecutor would have no obliga-
tion under Brady to discover and disclose this evidence. 345 Brady im-
poses these limitations even though nondisclosure certainly harms a
defendant deprived of the opportunity to use every shred of evidence
to his advantage in these circumstances.
340 See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 110 (1976) ("Nor do we believe the constitutional obligation is measured by the moral
culpability, or the willfulness, of the prosecutor. If evidence highly probative of innocence
is in his file, he should be presumed to recognize its significance even if he has actually
overlooked it." (footnote and citation omitted)).
341 See supra Part II.B.
342 See supra Part II.B.
343 Cf, e.g., United States v. Woodruff, 296 F.3d 1041, 1043 n.1 (I1th Cir. 2002) ("To
establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show ... that the government possessed
evidence favorable to the defendant. . . ."); United States v. Hughes, 211 F.3d 676, 688 (1st
Cir. 2000) (holding that a prosecutor had no obligation to disclose evidence possessed by
foreign entity because the government had no control over the evidence).
344 See supra notes 62-63, 67 and accompanying text.
345 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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The search standard proposed in Part IV.A, which requires
greater prosecutorial notice, minimizes the administrative burden
posed by a prosecutor's Brady obligations and provides safe harbors
for government entities not wishing to come under a prosecutor's dis-
closure duty. Moreover, the standard implements all the policies that
disclosure is intended to serve-preserving the adversarial system of
justice, preventing prosecutorial misconduct, preventing harm to de-
fendants, promoting public confidence in criminal convictions, and
ensuring the administration of accurate convictions.
1. Preserving the Adversarial System of Justice
By requiring that defendants make specific requests in those
cases in which the government entity thought to possess Brady mate-
rial has acted under the direction and control of law enforcement
rather than a prosecutor, the proposed standard preserves the adver-
sarial system of justice. The criminal justice system seeks to imple-
ment the criminal laws in a way that effectuates not only substantive
goals but also process goals.3 46 Among these process goals is the pres-
ervation of the adversarial system of adjudication. 347 Under the adver-
sarial system of adjudication, each party is responsible for
investigating the facts. It is commonly believed that adversaries will
discover more facts and transmit more useful information to the fact
finder using this approach. 3 48 Indeed, the discovery process itself is
adversarial in nature. For example, the federal discovery rules condi-
tion a prosecutor's right to discovery on the defendant's exercise of
his rights to discovery349 (with the exception of cases involving the
public alibi, insanity, or public-authority defense provisions).35o In ad-
dition, a prosecutor is not obligated to disclose to a defendant all evi-
dence that might be helpful to him, but only that evidence which the
346 For a discussion of the criminal law's process goals, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JER-
OLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6 (1984).
-147 See id. § 1.6(a), at 37-42.
348 Id. § 1.6(a), at 38, 40; see also Zacharias, supra note 37, at 56 (describing various
justifications for the adversarial model and observing that "[w] hen the various justifications
for the adversary system are considered as a whole, one can see that the 'justice' it strives
for has several elements" and that "[alscertaining the true facts is not the only or para-
mount goal. Fairness and respect for client individuality play an equal part, even though
full assertion of client rights may interfere with truth-seeking. Efficient fact-finding also is
an important objective").
349 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1) (discussing information subject to disclosure by the
defendant). For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence permit the prosecution to seek
from the defense any scientific reports produced by the defense in connection with the
case only after the defendant has exercised his right to obtain similar reports from the
prosecution. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B). For a discussion of reciprocal and condi-
tional discovery, see 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 346, § 19.4(d), at 517-19.
350 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1, 12.2, 12.3.
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prosecution is statutorily and constitutionally required to disclose. 35 1
Any other discovery approach would transform the American adver-
sarial system of justice into an inquisitorial system, in which the devel-
opment of relevant facts is primarily the state's responsibility.
352
Therefore, to preserve the adversarial nature of the discovery process
and to enable the parties to discover as many relevant facts as possible,
courts should adopt a Brady search standard that requires the partici-
pation of both parties. The standard proposed in Part IV.A seeks to
achieve these goals by distributing the burden of discovering Brady
material not known to or possessed by a prosecutor or his investigative
arm between both the prosecutor and the defendant. Moreover, not
only does this standard make it more likely that the prosecution will
discover Brady material in the federal government's possession, the
specific request requirement also limits a prosecutor's administrative
burden by not imposing a duty to search every federal agency that may
be involved in the government's general investigation of international
terrorism.
2. Preventing Prosecutorial Misconduct
By clearly requiring that a prosecutor search a government entity
for Brady material only if the entity has engaged in law enforcement
activity under her direction and control or if the defendant has made
a specific request indicating the location and nature of the material,
the proposed standard prevents prosecutorial misconduct. Prosecu-
tors are held to the highest ethical standards. As the Supreme Court
observed in Agur.
For though the attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the ac-
cused with earnestness and vigor, he must always be faithful to his
client's overriding interest that 'justice shall be done." He is the
"servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer."35 3
A prosecutor, though she is required to comply with various legal and
ethical requirements in criminal proceedings, 354 presumably could
engage in a variety of forms of misconduct during the course of a
prosecution, including knowingly using false testimony; delaying dis-
closure of, suppressing, manipulating, or fabricating evidence; coerc-
351 See 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 346, § 19.3.
352 Cf 1 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 346, § 1.6, at 38 (comparing the inquisitorial
system of continental Europe with the American adversarial system).
353 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976) (quoting Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)); see also 1 AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
§ 3-1.1, at 6-8 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing the function of prosecutors).
354 See generally David Aaron, Note, Ethics, Law Enforcement, and Fair Dealing: A Prosecu-
tor's Duty to Disclose Nonevidentiay Information, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3005, 3008-27 (1999)
(discussing prosecutors' ethical and legal disclosure obligations).
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ing witnesses; prosecuting baseless charges; or otherwise neglecting
her legal and ethical obligations.3 55  Not only is preventing
prosecutorial misconduct a worthy ethical goal in and of itself,
preventing prosecutorial misconduct in the Brady context enables
courts to implement the other policies underlying Brady---preserving
the adversarial system of justice, ensuring the accuracy of convictions,
promoting public confidence in trial results, and ensuring that de-
fendants are treated fairly. If they wish to prevent prosecutorial mis-
conduct, courts must minimize opportunities for prosecutors to
neglect their obligation to discover and disclose Brady material not in
their possession or knowledge. Because the proposed standard gives
both the prosecution and the court a concrete standard for determin-
ing where the prosecutor must look and what she must look for, it is
less likely that a prosecutor will intentionally or negligently fail to
meet her prosecutorial disclosure obligations and thereby deceive
both the defendant and the court. In other words, if confusion as to
the scope and extent of the prosecution's search duty is minimized,
and the burden imposed by an unlimited prosecutorial search obliga-
tion is lessened, a prosecutor's office will be less able to use confusion
or administrative burden as an excuse for not disclosing information
to a defendant.
3. Promoting Public Confidence in Criminal Convictions
By clearly requiring that a prosecutor search all government enti-
ties that have engaged in law enforcement activity under his direction
and control, the proposed standard does not undermine public confi-
dence in criminal convictions. The need to preserve the appearance
of fairness in criminal trials is as important as providing fair proce-
dures to defendants. As the Supreme Court has stated, 'justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice. ' '35 6 In the Brady context, preserving
the appearance of fairness requires only that a prosecutor discover
and disclose all Brady material known to and possessed by him or his
investigative arm. The proposed standard promotes public confi-
dence in the fairness of criminal trials and the accuracy of criminal
convictions by requiring that a prosecutor search for and disclose all
exculpatory or impeachment material known to and possessed by gov-
355 For a chart of the most common forms of police and prosecutorial misconduct
leading to wrongful convictions, see Innocence Project, Police and Prosecutorial Miscon-
duct, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/policemisconduct.php (last visited Apr. 9,
2003).
354 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); see a/soJoint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 n.19 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("'In a
government like ours, entirely popular, care should be taken in every part of the system,
not only to do right, but to satisfy the community that right is done.'" (quoting The Wtitings
and Speeches of Daniel Webster)).
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ernment entities that engage in law enforcement activities under a
prosecutor's direction and control. The intelligence community is
generally understood not to serve the same law enforcement function
as the FBI, which collects evidence on behalf of federal prosecutors
for use in criminal prosecutions. 357 Therefore, the public is unlikely
to lose confidence in criminal convictions simply because the prosecu-
tion is not (absent a specific request) required to search the files of
government entities, like those within the intelligence community,
that have not engaged in law enforcement activities under a prosecu-
tor's direction and control.
4. Ensuring the Administration of Accurate Convictions
By removing from the scope of a prosecutor's search obligation
(absent a specific request) any entity that has not engaged in law en-
forcement activities under her direction and control, the proposed
standard does not undermine courts' ability to administer accurate
convictions. The Supreme Court has stated that "[t] he basic purpose
of a trial is the determination of truth,"3 58 and that "[d] iscovery, like
cross-examination, minimizes the risk that a judgment will be predi-
cated on incomplete, misleading, or even deliberately fabricated testi-
mony. [It serves] ... the broader public interest in a full and truthful
disclosure of critical facts. '13 59 Yet one must understand a trial's truth-
seeking purpose within the constraints imposed by the Constitution
and by criminal law, both of which provide various rules and proce-
dures that, when applied, functionally impede the truth-seeking func-
tion of a criminal trial. For example, the Constitution permits
defendants to refuse to testify at trial360 and constrains the prosecu-
tion's power to search for relevant evidence..3 61 In addition, the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure prevent prosecutors from
conducting discovery against defendants unless the defendant first at-
tempts to discover evidence in the government's possession.3 6 2 More-
over, courts routinely suppress incriminating but unlawfully obtained
357 For a discussion of the differences between the FBI's and CIA's functions, see IN-
TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE 21sT CENTURY, supra note 266, at 275-77.
358 Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); see also Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) ("Court proceedings are held for the solemn purpose of endeav-
oring to ascertain the truth which is the sine qua non of a fair trial.").
359 Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1988). In United States v. Nixon, the Su-
preme Court observed that "[t] he need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system
is both fundamental and comprehensive." Consequently, "[t]he ends of criminal justice
would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presenta-
tion of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the
system depend on full disclosure of all the facts." 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
360 See U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
361 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
362 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
demonstrative evidence under exclusionary rules,363, and often pre-
vent the admission of highly relevant and probative testimonial evi-
dence based on assertions of privilege. 364 These constraints and
exclusions demonstrate that courts must often decline to fully pro-
mote the truth-seeking function of a criminal trial in order to imple-
ment other important policies. In the Brady context, the judicial
desire to ensure the accuracy of criminal convictions 365 must be un-
derstood in light of the express limitations that the Supreme Court
has placed on the prosecution's search duty-the materiality require-
ment and the requirement that the material be in the government's
possession. The fact that courts do not require prosecutors to search
for and disclose evidence that would be merely helpful to defend-
ants,3 66 or to search for and disclose Brady material not in the govern-
ment's possession, 367 indicates that courts are not willing to disregard
the other policy considerations underlying Brady in an effort to maxi-
mize accuracy in criminal convictions. It is no surprise, then, that the
Kyles Court did not conclude that the accuracy of convictions would
be threatened by its holding that a prosecutor's duty to search for
Brady material is limited to entities that investigate crimes on her be-
half.368 Therefore, one should not infer in cases in which the condi-
tions of the proposed standard are not met and, therefore, in which
the prosecution has no duty to search the intelligence community for
Brady material, that the policy of ensuring the accurate administration
of convictions has not been given effect. Rather, one should under-
stand courts in these circumstances as merely giving limited effect to
363 For discussion of the exclusionary rules and other truth-impairing procedures, see
generally I LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 346, §§ 9.1-10.6; Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth
in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1374-85 (1991).
364 See FED. R. EvID. 501.
365 One commentator questions whether the Supreme Court's Brady cases demon-
strate any desire to ensure the accuracy of criminal convictions. Tom Stacy argues that any
conception of accurate adjudication has two components, one relating to "error-avoid-
ance," which concerns whether a given procedure minimizes the total number of errone-
ous verdicts, and one relating to "error-allocation," which concerns how a given procedure
allocates errors between erroneous convictions and erroneous acquittals. Stacy, supra note
363, at 1406-07. Any conception of accurate adjudication, he argues, must decide whether
and to what extent either of these two components-error-avoidance or error-allocation-
will be more important. Id. at 1407. Stacy observes that criminal procedure traditionally
has taken an innocence-weighted approach (which views erroneous convictions as worse
than erroneous acquittals) to error-allocation that regards error-allocations as more impor-
tant than error-avoidance. Id. at 1408. He observes, however, that the Supreme Court's
materiality requirement in the Brady context deviates from criminal procedure's inno-
cence-weighted approach: "[T]he [materiality] standard increases the number of errone-
ous verdicts and violates a conception of accuracy emphasizing either error-avoidance or
an innocence-weighted approach to error-allocation." Id. at 1417 (footnote omitted).
366 See supra Part I.A.
367 See supra Part I.B.
368 Cf. supra note 119 and accompanying text (describing the search duty imposed by
Kyles).
1544 [Vol. 88:1471
2003] PROSECUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
the policy due to a need to implement the other policies underlying
the Brady decision.
5. Preventing Harm to Defendants
Finally, defendants are not harmed-in the sense that they are
not deprived of a fair trial-simply because a prosecutor's search obli-
gation does not (absent a specific request) extend beyond those gov-
ernment entities that have engaged in law enforcement activities
under his direction and control. As discussed in Part I.A, the Brady
Court understood harm to defendants in terms of prosecutorial mis-
conduct, accuracy of convictions, and deception of the court..3 69 As
discussed throughout this subpart, the proposed standard implements
all of these policies.370 Moreover, because harm to defendants may
also include unfair surprise at trial,371 it should be noted that the pro-
posed standard does not increase the likelihood of unfair surprise be-
cause it does not deprive defendants of Brady material within a
prosecutor's possession or within the possession of the prosecution's
investigative arms. Prosecutors gain no evidentiary advantage by vir-
tue of the limited search obligation, and neither defendants nor the
courts are defrauded by prosecutors who may in fact have access to
materials to which they claim to have no access.
CONCLUSION
Law enforcement's ability to investigate international terrorism is
in a precarious state. Thus, the effective investigation of international
terrorism requires extensive cooperation among government agen-
cies. Because disclosure of intelligence community files to suspected
international terrorists could undermine the government's ability to
monitor and penetrate terrorist networks, imposing on prosecutors
the duty to search for and disclose Brady material within intelligence
community files, regardless of the nature of the intelligence commu-
nity's relationship to the prosecution, could eviscerate the govern-
ment's already limited ability to investigate international terrorism
effectively. The Brady search standards adopted by the courts of ap-
peals have the potential to do just that. For this reason, courts can
and must adopt a construction of the Supreme Court's line of Brady
369 See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
370 See supra Part IV.C.2-4.
371 The purpose of discovery is, in part, to avoid unfair surprise. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16
advisory committee's note (stating that "broad discovery contributes to the fair and effi-
cient administration of criminal justice by ... minimizing the undesirable effect of surprise
at the trial"). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has stated that "the ends of justice will best
be served by a system of liberal discovery which gives both parties the maximum possible
amount of information with which to prepare their cases and thereby reduces the possibil-
ity of surprise at trial." Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 411 n.16 (1988).
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cases that limits a prosecutor's duty to search government entities for
exculpatory or impeachment material if the federal courts-as op-
posed to military tribunals-are to function as the appropriate forum
for the prosecution of international terrorists. Such an approach
would impose on a prosecutor a duty to search government entities
not acting under his direction and control for Brady material only if a
defendant requests the material with enough specificity to indicate
both its location within government and its nature, and would require
a prosecutor to search only those files that are the product of law en-
forcement activities conducted under his direction and control and in
relation to a specific criminal investigation. In other words, a prosecu-
tor should be required to search the files of government entities only
if those entities have acted in a law enforcement capacity under his
direction and control. Only this limited approach implements all of
the policies that disclosure is intended to serve-preserving the adver-
sarial system ofjustice, preventing prosecutorial misconduct, prevent-
ing harm to defendants, promoting public confidence in criminal
convictions, and ensuring the administration of accurate convic-
tions-while simultaneously serving the government's interest in
preventing the disclosure of classified information relating to sus-
pected international terrorists.
The necessity of adopting a limited prosecutorial obligation to
search the government for Brady material cannot be understated, for a
government unable to prosecute certain classes of offenses in its
courts is left with no other option but to attempt prosecution in an-
other forum or to avoid prosecution altogether. 72 Trying interna-
372 The U.S. government could pursue a variety of extra-judicial strategies to prevent
international terrorism. See Raphael F. Perl, Cong. Research Serv., Pub. No. 1B95112, Ter-
rorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy 4 (2001), http://www.fpc.gov/CRSREPS/
tf1217.pdf (discussing the policy framework through which past administrations have re-
sponded to terrorism and the dilemmas of these approaches). For example, the govern-
ment could take diplomatic or economic action to persuade foreign states and
organizations to assist in the war on terrorism. Congress already has granted the President
authority to take such action. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 324, 110 Stat. 1214, 1255 (finding that
because the United Nations has been an inadequate forum for the discus-
sion of cooperative, multilateral responses to the threat of international ter-
rorism, the President should continue to undertake efforts to increase the
international isolation of state sponsors of international terrorism, includ-
ing efforts to strengthen international sanctions, and should oppose any
future initiatives to ease sanctions on Libya or other state sponsors of
terrorism
see also International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 § 505, 22
U.S.C. § 2349aa-9 (2000) (granting the President the power to ban the importation of any
goods or services from any country that supports terrorism); International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (empowering the President to regulate
international financial transactions in times of emergency). Specifically, the United States
could seek to persuade foreign nations to criminalize international terrorists activities, in-
vestigate them-with or without help from U.S. law enforcement-and then either prose-
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tional terrorists in alternative fora is precisely what President Bush has
proposed to do in creating military tribunals. However, this approach
raises several concerns, the most significant of which is that secret tri-
als may undermine the legitimacy of the war against terrorism. If
other nations begin to perceive the tribunals as unjust mechanisms for
exacting arbitrary retribution, they may be less willing to cooperate
with the United States in the war on terrorism. 373 In addition, trying
non-citizens under different standards than those that Americans
would face for similar crimes increases the chances that Americans
tried abroad may face the same double standard in the future.37 4 Fi-
nally, trying suspected international terrorists under rules inconsistent
with traditional notions of due process undermines the authority of
constitutional principles and sets a precedent for future prosecutions
of other crimes in alternative fora whenever the nation faces unusual
challenges. In light of the threat to the integrity of the criminal jus-
tice system posed by criminal prosecutions in military tribunals, the
cute terrorists themselves or extradite them to some nation that will. Alternatively, the
government could initiate covert paramilitary operations-action deigned to produce a
particular result in a foreign countly while concealing U.S. involvement. See HOLT, supra
note 292, at 135-67 (discussing the nature, benefits, and shortcomings of covert CIA ac-
tion); PILLAR, supra note 1, at 120; JOHN B. WOLF, ANTITERRORIST INITIATIVES vii-xi, 18-19
(1989) (discussing the advantages of open paramilitary action coupled with an effective
propaganda campaign). In 1996, Congress authorized the President to order covert action
to prevent international terrorism. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 § 324, 110 Stat. at 1255 (finding that "the President should use all necessary means,
including covert action and military force, to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy international
infrastructure used by international terrorists, including overseas terrorist training facilities
and safe havens"). In addition, the government could take full-scale, direct military action
to hunt down and destroy international terrorist networks and the political regimes that
harbor them. See Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Use of Force by a State Against Terrorists in
Another Country, in TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE: LIMITS & POSSIBILITIES OF LEGAL CON-
TROL 245 (Henry H. Han ed., 1993). However, it is not clear that any of these alternatives
is a viable method of preventing international terrorism both in the short and long term.
See PILLAR, supra note 1, at 85, 90-92 (discussing the advantages of permitting other states
to prosecute terrorists but noting the obstacle posed by differing legal regimes); Richard
Falk, Ending Terrorism, in TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE, supra, at 430 (observing that
covert operations are "inherently more difficult to constrain within limits of law and moral-
ity"); Phil Williams, Combating Transnational Organized Crime, in TRANSNATIONAL THREATS:
BLENDING LAw ENFORCEMENT AND MILITARY STRATEGIES 197 (Carolyn W. Pumphrey ed.,
2000) (observing the difficulty of distinguishing the good guys from the bad guys when
militarily engaging criminals abroad). Moreover, although use of political, economic, and
military force could conceivably prevent international terrorism, it appears to be no way
for a government to enforce its criminal laws solely against those who would violate them.
373 Foreign nations have already expressed such sentiments. The Spanish, for exam-
ple, flirted with the notion of refusing to extradite suspected al-Qaeda members because of
the U.S. decision to employ military tribunals. See Jonah Goldberg, Europeans Save the
World, NAT'L REV., Nov. 30, 2001, http://www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/goldberg
113001.shtml.
374 See William Glaberson, Critics' Attack on Tribunals Turns to Law Among Nations, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2001, at B1; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Tougher than Terror: To Fight Criminal
Terrorism We Need to Strengthen Our Domestic and Global System of Criminal Justice, Not Militarize
It, Am. PROSPECT, Jan. 28, 2002, at 22.
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courts must adopt a construction of the prosecution's duty to search
for Brady material that invites the government to prosecute in that
forum-one that requires a search of intelligence community files
only in instances in which the intelligence community has acted as a
law enforcement entity under a prosecutor's direction and control.
